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ABSTRACT 
 
I examined the proposition that there are psychological limits on what 
scientific problems can be solved, and that these limits may be based 
on a failure to be able to produce imagable, observation-based models 
for any possible solution, a position suggested by philosopher Colin 
McGinn in an argument attempting to prove that the mind-body problem is 
unsolvable. I examined another likely candidate for an unsolvable 
problem -- the ultimate origin of the universe (i.e., what might have 
preceded the Big Bang or any other starting point; why there should be 
something rather than nothing) -- by exploring the reasoning of 
physicists about this problem and measuring visual imagery frequency 
and vividness, with the expectation that those who most believed the 
problem unsolvable would be more frequent/vivid imagers and therefore 
more affected by the apparent impossibility of producing an imagable 
solution. Eight physicists were interviewed and imagery frequency and 
vividness measurements performed using Cohen & Saslona's IDQ-IHS and 
Marks's VVIQ, respectively. All subjects considered the problem 
unsolvable within today's physics and all but one thought the problem 
still meaningful, though none were optimistic about a solution. The one 
subject who dismissed the problem had the lowest imagery frequency 
score, and there was also a significant rank order correlation (r = 
0.83, p < .02) between degree of belief in problem unsolvability 
(extended to include viewing the problem as meaningful and not already 
solved) and a composite imagery frequency/vividness score, though the 
sample was too small to control for some possible confounding factors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Cognitive Limits 
 
The question of what if any limits there are to what the 
human mind can know has long been a subject of 
philosophical examination. Recently, the problem has been 
posed more directly as a psychological question: Are there 
problems that cannot be solved because of inherent 
limitations in human cognitive processing ? Fodor (1983) 
argues that the existence of such limitations, which make 
the mind, to use Fodor's term, "epistemically bounded" (p. 
120), are not only supported by his thesis for the 
modularity of various cognitive functions, but are almost 
certainly present in any case simply because of the 
existence at the lowest level of fixed and constrained 
cognitive structure: 
Any psychology must attribute some endogenous 
structure to the mind.... And it's hard to see how, in 
the course of making such attributions of endogenous 
structure, the theory could fail to imply some 
constraints on the class of beliefs that the mind can 
entertain. (p. 125) 
 A psychology which guarantees our epistemic 
unboundedness would thus have to guarantee that, 
whatever sort of subject domain the world turns out to 
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be, somewhere in the space of hypotheses that we are 
capable of entertaining there is the hypothesis that 
specifies its structure.... I don't see how any 
remotely plausible cognitive theory could conceivably 
do so. (pp. 122-123) 
 
Fodor's claim has a priori credibility, but is there good 
empirical evidence for it ? Fodor offers support from an 
evolutionary perspective by observing that we accept such 
limitations without question in the case of other species, 
and "would presumably not be impressed by a priori 
arguments intended to prove (e.g.) that the true science 
must be accessible to spiders" (p. 126). 
 
However, while true, it is also the case that we would not 
expect a spider to raise or grasp scientific problems, and 
the interesting claim in the case of humans is not so much 
that there is, as (presumably) for the spider, knowledge so 
beyond comprehension that we cannot even grasp the problems 
that such knowledge would address but rather that there are 
problems we can grasp but cannot solve. Note also that the 
psychological question of interest here is only on problems 
where we suppose that the limitations on being able to 
solve them are conceptual, or cognitive, in nature. This 
eliminates problems whose limitations arise from formal 
aspects of the problem or surrounding theory (e.g., 
undecidable theorems in mathematics, or quantum 
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uncertainties) or from fairly direct resource constraints 
(e.g., our inability in a chess game to look ahead 
sufficiently far to determine the absolute best move). 
 
 
Unsolvable Problems  
 
The history of science and philosophy suggests at least two 
problems as possibly being cognitively unsolvable: the 
problem of explaining the origin of the universe, and the 
"consciousness" part of the mind-body problem -- providing 
an explanation for subjective experience. The study 
methodology will focus only on the problem of the origin of 
the universe, but some initial examination of the mind-body 
problem as well from the perspective of unsolvability is 
useful for better understanding the issues involved and the 
possible basis for unsolvability proposed below, especially 
since that proposed basis was suggested by work on the 
mind-body problem. 
 
There may be other such cognitively unsolvable problems, 
but, if so, these two are likely the most noteworthy. Also, 
note again that the focus here is on problems where the 
limits on solvability are presumed to be psychological and, 
more specifically, cognitive, rather than, for example, as 
demonstrated by some external proof (e.g., the halting 
problem for Turing machines).  The interesting question of 
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problems that cannot even be grasped is, again, also 
ignored; leaving aside the difficulty (impossibility ?) of 
examining such problems, their solutions are presumably 
excluded from human understanding as well.  
 
It is also assumed that these problems are in fact 
substantive and not merely the result of philosophic or 
linguistic confusion (while the latter has been suggested 
by some for each problem, the viewpoint of this study is 
that the problems are real and could, in principle, have 
scientific answers).  
 
The Origin of the Universe 
 
Historical and modern-day attempts to explain the origin of 
the universe basically fall into one of three general 
types:  
 1. The universe came into existence at some finite 
point in the past, before which there was "nothing". This 
sort of explanation can be seen in Biblical and other 
religious writings and in the modern-day "Big Bang" theory 
(as described, for example, in Hawking, 1988, or Penrose, 
1989), though there is of course considerable variation and 
contemporary refinement on how this happened (e.g., divine 
creation vs. a "quantum fluctuation" in the vacuum that 
preceded the universe, as described by Hawking or Penrose; 
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this is discussed in more detail below) and what 
constituted the "nothing" that preceded the universe. 
 2. The universe has existed forever (or perhaps is 
born and dies in an endless cycle). This was essentially 
Aristotle's view (as shown in On the Heavens in McKeon, 
1966), and can also be found in the modern-day (though 
currently not fashionable) "steady-state" theory (see again 
Hawking, 1988). (I will ignore questions about changes in 
the universe, e.g., whether it is expanding or contracting, 
since changes in its form are not relevant to the question 
of explaining why it should exist at all.) 
 3. The question of how the universe began is 
unanswerable, "transcendent," or perhaps meaningless. This 
is the view of some contemporary philosophers such as 
Wittgenstein (1921/1961) and Munitz (1986) (though, as 
Munitz discusses, there are historical antecedents for this 
view as well), both of whom consider the question not fully 
answerable but nevertheless legitimate in some sense: 
"transcendent" for Munitz, and part of the "mystical" for 
Wittgenstein (though this is the early Wittgenstein of the 
Tractatus), which, though it cannot be talked about,  
nevertheless exists. Wittgenstein earlier introduces the 
idea of such limits with regard to ethics and value in 
general: 
 All propositions are of equal value.  
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 The sense of the world must lie outside the 
world. In the world everything is as it is ... in it, 
no value exists....  
 Propositions can express nothing that is higher. 
 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. 
 Ethics is transcendental. 
 If the good or bad exercise of the will does 
alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the 
world, not the facts -- not what can be expressed by 
means of language. 
 In short, the effect must be it becomes an 
altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax 
and wane as a whole. [emphasis in original] (pp. 145-
147) 
  
Though real in some way -- "transcendental" -- these things 
"cannot be put into words," only experienced as "an 
altogether different world." With regard to the broader 
problem of why life or the universe should exist at all, 
Wittgenstein states the following:   
 ... is some riddle solved by my surviving for 
ever ? Is not this eternal life as much of a riddle as 
our present life ? The solution of the riddle of life 
in space and time lies outside space and time....  
     The facts all contribute only to setting the 
problem, not to its solution.  
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 It is not how things are in the world that is 
mystical but that it exists. 
 To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view 
it as a whole -- a limited whole. 
 Feeling the world as a limited whole -- it is 
this that is mystical.... 
     We feel that even when all possible scientific 
questions have been answered, the problems of life 
remain completely untouched. Of course there are then 
no questions left, and this itself is the answer.  
 The solution of the problem of life is seen in 
the vanishing of the problem. 
 (Is not this the reason why those who have found 
after a long period of doubt that the sense of life 
became clear to them have then been unable to say what 
constituted that sense ?) 
 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into 
words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is 
mystical. [emphasis in original] (pp. 149-150) 
 
For Wittgenstein, then, the direct experience of the 
problem -- "feeling the world as a limited whole" -- is 
real enough. However, all possible facts are only part of 
the "limited whole"; the solution must exist outside of it, 
"outside space and time." Although that necessarily yields 
nothing that can be stated or even talked about, there is 
11 
the possibility of wordless solutions (or at least 
experiences) that "make themselves manifest."  
 
Answers that fall under (3) can be viewed as arguing 
directly (though generally without any particular empirical 
evidence) for the thesis of cognitive limits I am trying to 
demonstrate (provided one excludes those explanations that 
dismiss the problem of the origin of the universe as 
entirely a pseudo-problem; I take as a given that the 
problem is substantive, and not to be dissolved entirely by 
any form of philosophical analysis). 
 
The problem with answers 1 and 2 is that, no matter what 
explanation is provided, it seems we can turn around and 
then ask for an explanation of it -- what is it's cause, or 
what came before it. In the case of a universe that has 
existed forever, this becomes the question of why or how 
there should be such a universe at all; and in the case of 
a universe arising from nothing, this becomes the question 
of why or how it was transformed from "nothing" to 
"something." 
 
Simply put, we seem to be stuck with the problem of why 
there should be anything at all, whether that anything be 
always existing or coming into existence at some point in 
time. The underlying problem is captured nicely by 
Wittgenstein's statement, quoted above, that "the facts all 
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contribute only to setting the problem, not to its 
solution", and stated more fully by Gasking, as reported in 
Black's commentary on Wittgenstein (1964):  
What we demand as an answer is something like a well-
confirmed hypothesis whose consequent is everything 
whatsoever -- the world contemplated sub specie 
aeterni as a limited whole, limited by an antecedent 
which is something, in spite of everything being in 
the consequent. (p. 374) 
     
Recently, a possible way out of the above dilemma appears 
to have been suggested by work in applying quantum 
mechanics to questions about the origin of the universe -- 
so-called "quantum cosmology" -- that allows a principled 
(i.e., within the currently conceived laws of physics) way 
to talk about "something coming from nothing." The physical 
basis of this idea is that a quantum fluctuation in the 
vacuum that preceded the universe led to the Big Bang and 
the subsequent creation of the universe, as well as the 
start of time itself. Grunbaum (1989), though primarily 
interested in rebutting the idea that a quantum cosmology 
offers support for biblical divine creation, argues that 
such a cosmology has in fact erased the question of the 
origin of the universe because (a) the transition from the 
vacuum to the Big Bang is now explained by physical law, 
and (b) the period before the Big Bang is also before the 
start of space/time itself, and it is therefore meaningless 
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to talk about an external cause (or any prior cause at all) 
for the shift from the vacuum, since there are no periods 
of time, and hence no meaningful causation, before the Big 
Bang. He states that Stephen Hawking, the British physicist 
and cosmologist, "reaches the conclusion that there is no 
problem of creation, because at that stage, the very 
distinction between space and time becomes mushy . . . " 
(p. 393). 
 
But this does not seem to square at all with Hawking's 
actual conclusions (1988) which, despite his own convincing 
presentation of the "something from nothing" position are 
stated as follows: 
How or why were the laws and the initial state of the 
universe chosen ? (p. 173) 
 Even if there is only one unified theory, it is 
just a set of rules and equations. What is it that 
breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe 
for them to describe ? The usual approach of science 
of constructing a mathematical model cannot answer the 
questions of why there should be a universe for the 
model to describe. Why does the universe go to all the 
bother of existing ? (p. 174) 
 
This appears to suggest that the new "quantum cosmology"  
has (at least for Hawking) only added a layer of new theory 
that itself needs to be explained. This seems to once again 
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point out that one can always demand a further explanation; 
that, as Munitz (1986) observes, the boundary of what is 
intelligible may shift but inevitably leaves an 
unintelligible residue; that, as Wittgenstein suggested, 
the facts only contribute to, and cannot solve the problem 
of why there should be anything at all.  
   
The Mind-Body Problem 
 
How are we to explain the existence of subjective 
awareness, of one's sense of self, or of the "raw feels" or 
qualia that constitute sensations ? Although this study 
will focus on the problem of the origin of the universe, 
some review of the mind-body problem is, again, useful for 
understanding the issues involved and a possible basis for 
problem unsolvability. Following Churchland (1985) we can 
quickly summarize the various historical and current 
solutions to this central aspect of the mind-body problem 
as falling into one of three camps: 
 1. Dualist solutions that, in one form or another, 
posit the existence of an independent subjective realm not 
reducible to physical or material phenomena. 
 2. Behavioral/linguistic solutions that effectively 
dismiss the problem as a pseudo-problem. 
 3. Various materialist points of view that posit a 
physical/physiological substrate that in one way or another 
is responsible for the existence of such subjective 
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phenomena; these include identity theories (that postulate 
a direct equivalence between brain states and mental 
processes), forms of eliminative materialism (that posit a 
neuroscientific basis for mental states that are, once 
understood, radically different from our common-sense 
understanding of those states as given by "folk 
psychology") and forms of functionalism, the 
computationally inspired view that equates mental processes 
or states (e.g., anger) with their place in a causal 
network that could potentially be instantiated by things 
other than human beings (e.g., computers or aliens; see 
Thagard, 1986 for a criticism that such a view is 
computationally naive, but Krellenstein, 1987, for a 
rejoinder). 
 
There is today relatively widespread (though certainly not 
universal) agreement that there must be some materialist 
and probably functionalist explanation for subjective 
experience; e.g., Flanagan (1984) states that functionalism 
is "the currently favored solution to the mind-body 
problem" (p. 243). However, there would seem to be equally 
general agreement that there has been no progress in 
providing any of the presumably physiological details. 
Worse, there is not even any accepted model or conception 
of what such an explanation might look like. Wittgenstein 
(1921/1961) has expressed the difficulty of the problem as 
follows: 
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The feeling of an unbridgeable gulf between 
consciousness and brain-process. . . . This idea of a 
difference in kind is accompanied by slight   
giddiness. . . . (p. 124) 
 
Such success as modern cognitive science has achieved on 
this issue has not really dealt with the problem of 
consciousness, which has been almost totally ignored by 
researchers (one notable exception being philosopher Daniel 
Dennett, in Dennett, 1978 and 1991, for example). Pylyshyn 
(1984), for one, has observed that "the theories have set 
aside questions about what constitutes qualia" (p. 45). 
Functionalism has done no better with such problems than 
any other theory, and it is exactly these problems that, in 
Pylyshyn's words are "the hardest puzzle [in philosophy of 
mind]" (p. 23).  
 
 
A Possible Basis for Unsolvability 
 
There is not much in the current literature to suggest an 
exact explanation for cognitive limitations. Fodor (1983) 
argues that such limitations may be due to the modularity 
and isolation of the various components of cognitive 
architecture, but this view does not easily lend itself to 
specific predictions about problems it may or may not be 
possible to solve. A more hopeful line of inquiry, however, 
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has been suggested by McGinn (1989) in the form of a direct 
argument for the unsolvability of the mind-body problem.  
McGinn's argument makes the suggestion that any concept 
which serves to causally explain a property of a physical 
object (the brain's production of consciousness, in this 
case) must have its roots, if loosely, in perception; and 
that this will be impossible in the case of the brain's 
production of consciousness, since one-half of that 
relation -- consciousness -- is itself paradigmatically 
unobservable.  McGinn says the following:  
Suppose we try out a relatively clear theory of how 
theoretical concepts are formed: we get them by a sort 
of analogical extension of what we observe. Thus, for 
example, we arrive at the concept of a molecule by 
taking our perceptual representations of macroscopic 
objects and conceiving of smaller scale objects of the 
same general kind. (pp. 358-359) 
 
McGinn points out that such a theory of concept formation 
does not pertain to all abstract concepts -- our ideas of 
numbers, for example, do not seem similarly based on some  
class of physical objects -- but only to those concepts 
providing causal explanations of physical, material 
phenomena. (Numbers and numerical relationships can be seen 
to model real-world phenomena in a process not fully 
understood, but we do not in any case accord them the kind 
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of direct causation of physical phenomena we accord atoms, 
or light waves, or forces.)  
 
This "clear theory" of concept formation contains the 
interesting suggestion that explanatory concepts are always 
at least loosely based on perceptual, non-abstract 
phenomena. Looking at this from a slightly different 
perspective, we might want to say that it must be possible 
to in some way visualize -- form an image of -- any 
concepts that can possibly serve to explain physical 
phenomena. This seems to capture the idea that such 
concepts must have their roots in perception in that, by 
virtue of being imagable, they are perceptual, even though 
the entities involved may of course not be directly 
observable. (The largely perceptual character of visual 
imagery is both a common-sense observation and one backed 
up by a substantial empirical literature; see, for example, 
Kosslyn, 1980).  
Thus, our understanding of liquids (to use an example from 
McGinn) is plausibly based on a molecular model that, 
though perhaps not observable, is based on a building-block 
model we can form an image of, and that can physically (if 
not observably) connect to the phenomena being explained.  
 
Applied to the problem of the origin of the universe, this 
suggests that that problem may also be unsolvable because 
of our inability to imagine (literally, that is, to form an 
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image of) anything outside of the universe  -- as would 
seem to be required of a concept explaining, or causing the 
universe. The difficulty is that the object to be explained 
-- the universe -- contains all possible observable 
phenomena, forcing the explanation to be unobservable in 
principle. If our explanatory concepts cannot be 
arbitrarily abstract but, rather, are tied at least by 
analogy to what we can observe, then we will be unable to 
form such concepts; there will be no observation-based 
concepts left to explain everything (the universe) that is 
potentially observable.   
 
A specific relationship between the unsolvability of "why 
anything should exist at all" and an inability to form 
appropriate mental images was suggested around the turn of 
the century by physicist Ludwig Boltzmann. Boltzmann 
expressed the view that scientific thinking should begin 
with images, rather than empirical data. Here are 
Boltzmann's words as reported by Miller (1984): 
"It is precisely the unclarities in the principles of 
mechanics that seem to me to derive from not starting 
at once with hypothetical mental pictures but trying 
to link up with experience from the outset. . . .  
     . . . [The] task of theory consists in 
constructing an image of the external world that 
exists purely internally and must be our guiding star 
in thought and experiment. . . ." (pp. 76-77) 
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Boltzmann went on to try to explicitly limit scientific 
thinking to problems where such hypothetical mental 
pictures could in fact be produced, stating that reasoning 
in the absence of such pictures was to "overshoot the mark" 
(p. 76), and was a waste of time. Boltzmann in fact gave as 
one of two explicit examples of such questions the question 
of "why the world exists at all" (the other example being 
"why the law of cause and effect itself holds", p. 76). 
 
 
General Study Objectives and Procedure  
 
The goal of this study will be to explore through 
interviews how subjects trained in physics but with a range 
of expertise reason about the origin of the universe, and 
to see what support their reasoning on this question 
provides for its being unsolvable, and for the basis of 
that unsolvability possibly lying in the inability to form 
a visual image of any possible solution to the problem. The 
expectation is that a significant number of subjects will 
claim a belief in the unsolvability of this problem, 
notwithstanding popular conceptions in the belief 
(especially among scientists) of the solvability of any 
problem that can be posed (McGinn, p. 365, states that he 
expects "that many readers of . . . [his] paper will find 
its main thesis utterly incredible, even ludicrous"). 
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Commonalities across subjects with varying levels of 
expertise or background would also offer some support for 
an explanation grounded in cognitive limitations (vs. 
problem familiarity or expertise).  
 
As to establishing a possible basis for such unsolvability, 
McGinn's views suggest a testable hypothesis: that 
individuals with poor visual imaging abilities (so-called 
"poor visualizers") will be less sensitive to the inability 
to imagine conceptual (perceptual) solutions to the 
problem, and will therefore be more likely to view the 
problem as abstractly solvable -- or perhaps even as 
already solved. Such poor visualizers may be more 
susceptible to a belief in what McGinn refers to as a kind 
of "magical emergentism" (p. 358): a willingness to believe 
in or accept the possibility of new concepts (or of the 
exaggerated explanatory power of existing concepts) that 
have no basis in what is or can be perceived, and 
consequently have no hope of really linking to the physical 
phenomena to be explained. McGinn speculates that there may 
be other forms of intelligence for whom such concepts are 
possible; but only a belief in "magic" makes them plausible 
for humans. (Religious answers to the problem of the origin 
of the universe may be seen as falling into this category 
to the extent they do no so much offer additional 
explanation as categorize and label all of the unknowns 
into a single equally unexplained entity.) 
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Put another way, poor visualizers do not as clearly 
perceive the inherent difficulties in finding physical 
explanations for unsolvable phenomena (which in fact 
require unimaginable solutions). Such individuals will be 
more accustomed to viewing all explanatory concepts as 
arbitrarily abstract (since the perceptual connectedness of 
successful explanation will be relatively lost on them), 
and will therefore be unreasonably optimistic about the 
arrival of new concepts to solve current problems.  
 
A positive correlation between imagery usage/ability and 
belief in the unsolvability of these problems may have a 
different explanation: that these problems are not 
unsolvable but, rather, do admit to very abstract and 
indeed non-perception-based solutions; and that individuals 
with high imagery usage/ability will simply be less 
inclined to believe in the existence and/or be able to 
formulate or comprehend such abstract solutions. Strictly 
speaking, the present study can only hope to show that 
there is indeed a positive link between imagery 
usage/ability and belief in problem unsolvability. It will 
be to future work to better identify the basis for any such 
observed relationship in the dependence of solvability on 
imagability rather than in any difficulty good visualizers 
may have in understanding or apprehending very abstract 
concepts (or some other factor).
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REVIEW OF RELATED WORK 
 
The following literature review addresses the hypothesis 
that unsolvability may be due to a failure in producing 
imagable representations, and that a study of the 
relationship between imagery use/vividness and beliefs in 
unsolvability can help test this hypothesis. The review 
does not much address the general question of whether or 
not there are unsolvable problems. As mentioned above, this 
has a long philosophic tradition, but, aside from the few 
works cited above, there is not much directly relevant 
psychological work.  
 
The review is divided into six sections: 
 1. Imagery, perception and causation: this section 
deals with that work most directly related to the 
hypothesis that causality is a concept constrained by 
imagable representations. 
 2. Imagery in scientific reasoning: this section deals 
with the considerable literature describing the role of 
imagery among scientists and in scientific discovery. Much 
of this work is historical and/or anecdotal in nature. 
 3. Individual differences in imagery: this section 
deals with the general (remaining) experimental literature 
concerning measurement of individual differences in imagery 
24 
and the relationship of such differences to problem-
solving, concept formation, creativity and memory. 
 4. Differences between novices and experts: this 
section reviews the literature demonstrating the 
differences in reasoning between novices and experts in a 
given domain. Such studies both demonstrate the importance 
of imagery/perception in the reasoning of novices and 
experts alike and, to the extent differences are not found 
in the proposed survey, could provide some support for an 
explanation of such results that is dependent on cognitive 
architecture and independent of expertise. 
 5. Philosophical perspectives: this section discusses 
some relevant philosophical issues. 
 6. Summary of relevant work: a summary of the key 
points in the preceding sections. 
 
 
Imagery, Perception and Causation 
 
Beyond the ideas of McGinn and Boltzmann, the hypothesis 
that explanatory adequacy requires perception-based 
constructs does not seem to have been directly pursued, at 
least by psychologists. There is, however, substantial work 
linking perception and causation, as well as work 
demonstrating the special role of imagery in understanding 
causal relationships. Zajonc (1976) endorses Goethe's 
mostly disputed view (presented in Goethe, 1978) that 
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scientific understanding arises not from rational analysis 
alone but also, and perhaps necessarily, from a perceptual, 
experiential interaction with the phenomenon being studied; 
that "to know is to have seen."  Zajonc observes that the 
word "theory" is Greek for "to behold," and argues for an 
educational program that encourages "perceptual encounters" 
with the phenomena to be explained. 
 
Some empirical support comes from work on the reasoning of 
novices and experts (reviewed more fully below), especially 
on the commonalities in the reasoning of novices and 
experts with regard to the use of imagery and image-based 
concepts. diSessa (1983) looked at how novices and experts 
approach problems in physics. While rejecting Goethe's idea 
that "phenomenology must be manifest in explicit science" 
(p. 16) -- an idea not itself required by the hypothesis 
that explanatory concepts are at least analogs of perceived 
objects -- diSessa presents evidence for the importance of 
direct experience in developing and applying abstract 
scientific concepts. Both the novices and experts in 
diSessa's study approach the solution of problems by 
recognizing phenomenal "primitives" such as springiness and 
rigidity. diSessa is principally concerned in showing that 
such immediate, black-box recognition, which she posits may 
have underlying neurophysiological support in the manner 
suggested by Carey and Diamond (1980) for facial 
recognition, is important for both novices and experts and 
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evolves with the acquisition of expertise. But her novice 
and expert protocols also show the important links between 
such recognition and primitives that are themselves 
phenomenally based and cued rather than arbitrarily 
abstract. While diSessa never directly suggests that her 
subjects' (particularly the experts') explanations are 
intrinsically tied to a phenomenal model, these protocols 
clearly support such a view (such support possibly being 
due to other factors):  
The general point . . . is, again, that one should 
expect expert understanding to be organized around 
phenomenology as much as simply around the abstract 
structure of the domain. This is true for reasons of 
continuity with naive ideas and insofar as control of 
reasoning (e.g. cueing) is an integral part of expert 
knowledge. (p. 28) 
 One might think experts would drop such  
[phenomenal] interpretations, except for pedagogical 
purposes. On the contrary, at least in some 
circumstances they invent more of them! (p. 25) 
 
Larkin (1983, and Larkin and Simon, 1987) has done similar 
work on scientific problem representation. Larkin showed 
that such representation differs significantly between 
experts and novices: novice representations consist of 
real-world objects and processes simulated in real time, 
while experts, though continuing to make use of naive 
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representations, additionally have a repertoire of 
"fictitious" technical entities which they use. Despite 
these differences, however, Larkin points out the 
perceptual, concrete basis for most (if not all) of even 
the experts' concepts: 
The naive representation [of the novice] is a direct 
simulation of events involving real (imagable) 
objects. It is less clear that the physical 
representation must always be imagable, but it is 
worthy of comment that most physical representations 
seem to have this feature. Even very abstract physical 
phenomena (e.g., energy states of an atom, 
conservation of quantum properties in the interaction 
of elementary particles) have corresponding imagable 
representations (energy levels, Feynman diagrams) used 
in solving related problems. (p. 79) 
 
Similarly, Yates, Bessman, Dunne, Jertson, Sly, & Wendelboe 
(1988) found from interviews that novice subjects 
attempting to solve motion problems did so through an 
imagined enactment of the problem situation, drawing on 
fairly specific and often inconsistent prototypes 
representing aspects of the motion involved; and drawing on 
incomplete formal theories only when personal experience 
was inadequate for such imagined enactments. deKleer and 
Brown (1988) discuss more generally the class of mental 
models of physical systems (whether held by novices or 
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experts) built around such imagined enactments. In their 
terms, such enactments are called "envisionments," and are 
defined as "running a qualitative simulation in the mind's 
eye" (p. 286). deKleer and Brown go on to say the 
following: 
One of the most important properties of envisionment 
is its ability to manifest a system's causality, which 
not only makes it extremely useful for constructing 
causal models of how and why the system functions, but 
also makes the envisionment sufficiently self-evident 
that it, also, can be "run" efficiently in the mind's 
eye; that is, envisionments have the property that 
each new state change is directly caused by a prior 
event. (p. 286) 
(More generally, the use of imagery in solving problems 
related to some sort of dynamic processing is today well 
established; see, for example, Kosslyn, 1980. Larkin and 
Simon, 1987, discuss the power of pictorial representations 
for inferencing in general.) 
 
From a developmental perspective, the existence of an early 
fundamental relationship between imagery/perception and 
causality has been addressed by Leslie and Keeble (1987), 
who demonstrated that 27-week old infants showed 
sensitivity to causal events (as suggested by recovery of 
attention following habituation after exposure to reversal 
of a causal vs. a non-causal event, controlling for other 
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event similarities). Leslie and Keeble suggest that such 
perception of causality may be a hard-wired, "cognitively 
impenetrable" capability, as also suggested by the 
persistence of "causal illusions" in adults (e.g., the 
perception of causation in certain successive movements  
even when the underlying mechanism is known); or as 
suggested by the Gestalt "common cause" dynamic (Rock, 
1983).  
 
The idea that cause and effect may be more a fundamental 
capability than learned concept is also supported by its 
centrality in reasoning; as Leslie and Keeble observe, "the 
idea of cause and effect lies at the heart of both 
commonsense and scientific thought" (p. 265). Similarly, 
Shoham (1990) states that ". . . there is a feeling that 
"nothing happens without a cause"; this is the so-called 
"principle of causality." (p. 217) 
 
Some recent research concerns the supposed developmental 
shift from perceptual to conceptual reasoning. Some of the 
work here (e.g., Keil, 1989, and Wellman and Gelman, 1988) 
offers evidence that contradicts this supposed shift, 
arguing not that the later reasoning is perceptual but 
rather that even young children's reasoning is often 
theory-based and built around causal concepts that are 
abstractions from directly perceived features. At first 
glance this appears to argue against the idea that 
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perception-based reasoning is important at all stages. 
However, the early theories of children discussed by Keil 
and others are only abstract in the sense that they deal 
with non-observables, as opposed to being abstract in the 
sense of being non-perception-based (the latter being the 
sense of "abstract" most used in this paper). As such, this 
work demonstrates only that the ability to embrace non-
visible and analogical concepts is already present in young 
children, and not that non-perception-based concepts (e.g., 
numbers or other abstract models) are importantly found in 
the causal reasoning of children (or adults).  
 
In fact, this developmental work often demonstrates the 
continuity between perceptual evidence and the earliest 
abstract (i.e., based on non-observables) reasoning, and, 
again, the special importance of causation. Medin and Ross 
(1989), for example, offer a variety of evidence not only 
pointing to the importance of specific examples (vs. some 
sort of abstractions) in reasoning but also for the 
position that "abstraction arises as a by-product of the 
use of examples," rather than as "the product of some 
autonomous process" (p. 206).  
 
 
Imagery in Scientific Reasoning 
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Imagery has been studied at least since Aristotle. James 
(1890) observes that imagery has figured importantly in the 
work of Hume, Berkeley, Locke and others, but goes on to 
point out that it was only with the work of Fechner in 1860 
that the philosophic assumption that there was a typical 
human mind with a constant set of abilities was first 
challenged with regard to mental images. Fechner studied 
his own images and those of "several other individuals," 
and "the result was to show a great personal diversity" 
(pp. 50-51).  
 
However, it was Galton's survey of the imaging ability of 
100 men (reported in Galton, 1883) that really marked the 
first wide-scale psychological study of imagery. (Indeed, 
Heidbreder, 1933, reports that Galton's questionnaire is 
"said to be the first employed for a large-scale 
investigation in psychology" (p. 109), and James, p. 51,  
describes Galton's publication of his results "to have made 
an era in descriptive Psychology.")  
 
Galton's work not only began the serious scientific study 
of imagery but also began a tradition of studying the place 
of imagery in scientific reasoning. Galton states that "at 
least half [of the 100 men surveyed] . . . are 
distinguished in science or in other fields of intellectual 
work" (p. 89). Galton asked these men questions about their 
background and subjective experience of visual images, many 
32 
based on their response to imagining a now well-known 
"breakfast-table," the basic form of which is to be found 
in  several modern measurements of imagery (e.g., the 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire, or VVIQ for 
short, as described by Marks, 1973): 
"Before addressing yourself to any of the Questions on 
the opposite page, think of some definite object -- 
suppose it is your breakfast-table as you sat down to 
it this morning -- and consider carefully the picture 
that rises before your mind's eye. 
 1. Illumination.--Is the image dim or fairly 
clear? Is its brightness comparable to that of the 
actual scene? 
 2. Definition.--Are all the objects pretty well 
defined at the same time, or is the place of sharpest 
definition at any one moment more contracted than it 
is in a real scene? 
 3. Colouring.--Are the colours of the china, of 
the toast, bread-crust, mustard, meat, parsley, or 
whatever may have been on the table, quite distinct 
and natural?" [quotations in original] (p. 84) 
 
The results of Galton's survey are not presented with much 
statistical detail, and are freely mixed with even less 
formal and anecdotal material. They nevertheless present 
some striking results and observations (more or less based 
on those results) that are echoed by much, though not all, 
33 
subsequent research. One of these is the significant 
variability in imagery that Galton found, including its 
reported absence in about 10% of his sample, especially 
among a significant number of scientists (which surprised 
Galton, given the self-reported visual character of his own 
thinking): 
To my astonishment, I found that the great majority of 
the men of science to whom I first applied protested 
that mental imagery was unknown to them. . . . They 
had no more notion of its true nature than a colour-
blind man . . . has of the nature of colour. (p. 85) 
 
Galton contrasts these responses with those of non-
scientists: 
On the other hand, when I spoke to persons whom I met 
in general society, I found an entirely different 
disposition to prevail. Many men and a yet larger 
number of women, and many boys and girls, declared 
they habitually saw mental imagery, and that it was 
perfectly distinct to them and full of colour. The 
more I pressed and cross-questioned them, professing 
myself to be incredulous, the more obvious was the 
truth of their first assertions. They described their 
imagery in minute detail. . . . (pp. 85-86). 
 
Of the people who had at least some understanding of 
imagery, Galton goes on to describe in detail a wide range 
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of reported vividness that, he says, testifies "to the 
variety of experiences to be met with in a moderately large 
circle" (p. 89). This includes the above descriptions of 
very vivid images ("brilliant, distinct, never blotchy") 
through "fairly clear" and finally to "dim and indistinct" 
(pp. 89-91).  
 
Galton concludes from the relative lack of imagery among 
scientists that vivid imagery is, in general, antagonistic 
to the abstract thought of such scientists (though he says 
elsewhere that the evidence, though perhaps suggesting an 
hereditary factor, does not let us conclude whether lack of 
imagery is a cause or effect of such abstract thought): 
My own conclusion is, that an over-ready perception of 
sharp mental pictures is antagonistic to the 
acquirement of habits of highly generalised and 
abstract thought, especially when the steps of 
reasoning are carried on by words as symbols, and that 
if the faculty of seeing the pictures was ever 
possessed by men who think hard, it is very apt to be 
lost by disuse. (p. 88) 
 
This point has been made informally by many others. Pear 
(1927), discussing the general utility of imagery in 
thinking, says that "Napoleon's famous dictum has impressed 
many, that 'those who . . . [ellipses in original] form a 
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picture (tableau) of everything . . . are unfit to 
command'" (p. 6). 
 
Galton elaborates further on this point by pointing out 
that relatively clearer imagery is found among the less 
abstract vocations -- he mentions mechanics, engineers, 
architects and physicists (presumably experimental 
physicists, assuming the idea of a purely theoretical 
physicist was not as familiar at the time Galton worked as 
it is today) -- and less prominent among those "men who 
deal much with abstract ideas" (p. 110), and Galton says he 
has found exactly that to be the case among philosophers. 
(An interesting point of anecdotal support for this 
position and for the current proposal that imagery 
vividness is related to a belief in the unsolvability of 
the problems under consideration is the fact that 
philosopher Daniel Dennett -- one of the most ardent and 
optimistic workers at developing theoretical explanations 
of consciousness -- claims (according to D. Reisberg, 
personal communication, 1987) to have no visual mental 
images at all.) 
 
However, far from dismissing the importance of imagery for 
scientific thought, Galton goes on to suggest that this 
often-found absence of imagery is a hindrance to the best 
scientific thinking:  
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The highest minds are probably those in which it [the 
faculty of seeing the pictures] is not lost, but 
subordinated, and is ready for use on suitable 
occasions. (p. 88) 
 
Galton recounts many of the familiar stories of the 
impressive ways images are sometimes used (e.g., in 
blindfolded chess play, or in the ability to take in  a 
large amount of information at a glance, as it were). He 
goes on to observe the following: 
There can, however, be no doubt as to the utility of 
the visualising faculty when it is duly subordinated 
to the higher intellectual operations. A visual image 
is the most perfect form of mental representation 
wherever the shape, position and relations of objects 
in space are concerned. . . . Strategists, artists of 
all denominations, physicists who contrive new 
experiments, and in short all who do not follow 
routine, have need of it. (p. 113) 
 
In summary, Galton makes several points we will see 
repeated by others: 
 1. There is considerable variability in visual imagery 
ability. 
 2. Imagery can be antagonistic to abstract thinking. 
 3. Imagery can nevertheless be useful, if not 
necessary, for the very best or most creative thinking. 
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These points all offer some support for the current 
proposal in that they suggest that:   
 1. Imagery may play a central or necessary role for 
certain thinking. 
 2. Despite (and perhaps because of) this role, imagery 
or the lack thereof (a lack which may come not only from 
poor visualizing ability but from problem characteristics) 
may be a limiting factor for certain problems. 
 3. Individual differences in imagery may be profitably 
examined.  
 
James (1890) cites Galton's findings approvingly, and, by 
way of both summary and support for Galton's finding of 
significant imagery variability, makes the often cited 
observation (exemplified by James's report of one of his 
students) that "some people undoubtedly have no visual 
images at all worthy of the name" (p. 57).  
 
This idea has received support from a number of other early 
writers on the subject. Griffitts (1927), in a survey of 
various types of imagery, reports that "it was very 
interesting to find some subjects in doubt as to just what 
a visual image is" (p. 70). Aveling (1927), arguing for the 
position that imagery may be useful but hardly, as the 
ancients thought, necessary for thinking, reasons from the 
basis of his own lack of visual images while thinking. 
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Aveling's self-report is rendered more believable by being 
placed in a context that shows Aveling at least understands 
the concept: 
I do not normally enjoy visual imagery in thinking; 
nor can I call it up at will. . . . Yet . . . I know 
what it is to experience visual imagery, since the 
dreams I remember are often sufficiently vivid to be 
confused with actual visual perception; and, moreover, 
of imagery of other kinds I possess a fair abundance.   
(p. 15) 
(More recently, McKellar, as reported in Kosslyn, 1980, 
studied members of Mensa, an organization for high IQ 
individuals, and found that 97% of those surveyed reported 
having visual images. Though the 3% without such images is 
a smaller number that Galton's 10%, it is of perhaps 
greater interest that, again, a significant if small number 
of individuals report having no such imagery at all.) 
 
The mathematician Hadamard (1945) has also looked at the 
role of imagery in scientific (especially mathematical) 
thought, as well as speculating about the reasons for this 
role. The key point for Hadamard is the ability of imagery 
to present to the mind a complete creative effort -- be it 
a mathematical proof, a chess position or a symphony -- as 
a single entity. Hadamard compares the process to that of 
recognizing a person (cf. the work of diSessa described 
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above; diSessa makes exactly the same comparison to facial 
recognition):   
The true process of thought in building up a 
mathematical argument is certainly . . . to be 
compared with . . . the act of recognizing a person. 
An intermediate case which illustrates the analogy . . 
. is afforded by psychological studies on chess 
players, some of whom, as is well known, can play ten 
or twelve games simultaneously without seeing the 
chess boards. Inquires were started, especially by 
Alfred Binet, in order to understand how this was 
possible: their results may be summed up by saying 
that for many of these players, each game has, so to 
say, a kind of physiognomy, which allows him to think 
of it as a unique thing, however complicated it may 
be, just as we see the face of a man.  
     Now, such a phenomenon necessarily occurs in 
invention of any kind. . . . 
     Similarly, any mathematical argument, however 
complicated, must appear to me as a unique thing. I do 
not feel I have understood it as long as I do not 
succeed in grasping it in one global idea. (p. 65) 
 
Hadamard presents a similar statement by Mozart describing 
his process of composition: 
"The work grows; I keep expanding it, conceiving it 
more and more clearly until I have the entire 
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composition finished in my head though it may be long. 
Then my mind seizes it as a glance of my eye a 
beautiful picture or a handsome youth. It does not 
come to me successively, with its various parts worked 
out in detail, as they will be later on, but it is in 
its entirety that my imagination lets me hear it." (p. 
16) 
 
Hadamard also cites the mathematical work of Poincare. 
Poincare (1908) has written about the particular importance 
of this global view at the moment of creative problem 
solution -- of the "appearances of sudden illumination"   
(p. 55) that, in a glance, reveals the long-sought 
solutions of various mathematical problems. (Wallis, 1926, 
subsequently postulated four stages of creative thought: 
preparation, incubation, illumination and verification.)  
 
Hadamard also presents an excerpt from a letter by Einstein 
stressing his use of images, particularly with regard to 
their role in presenting combinations of elements: 
"The words or the language, as they are written or 
spoken, do not seem to play any role in my mechanism 
of thought. The psychical entities which seem to serve 
as elements in thought are certain signs and more or 
less clear images which can be voluntarily reproduced 
and combined. 
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     There is, of course, a certain connection between 
those elements and relevant logical concepts. It is 
also clear that the desire to arrive finally at 
logically connected concepts is the emotional basis of 
this rather vague play with the above mentioned 
elements. But taken from a psychological viewpoint, 
this combinatory play seems to be the essential 
feature in productive thought. . . ." (p. 142) 
  
Similarly, Hadamard reports Poincare's point that imagery 
seems necessary not only for problem recognition but also, 
in the last (or "verification") stage of creative work, to 
maintain the combination of elements in a particular 
problem solution while the details are worked out or 
verified, "in order that the useful hookings, once 
obtained, may not get lost" (p. 77).  
 
Despite the importance of images for Hadamard himself and 
for the work of several others he describes, his general 
review of work in this area convinces him of the 
variability of the exact nature and role of imagery in 
scientific thinking; he states that "the nature of .. 
concrete representations may vary considerably from one 
mind to the other" (p. 99). Hadamard also recognizes the 
point made by Galton and others that imagery may not always 
play a facilitating role, and mentions a statement by Binet 
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that "there exists a kind of antagonism between image and 
reflection" (p. 73).  
 
Some data describing such differences on a vocational basis 
-- data that is more recent and carefully presented than 
the vocational data of Galton -- is available from Roe 
(1951), who has studied the personalities of research 
scientists in a variety of professions with some emphasis 
on the place of imagery in their work. Roe concludes the 
following:  
The biologists are concentrated in the visual imagery 
group. So are the experimental physicists, while the 
theoretical physicists more characteristically employ 
verbal or other symbolizations. The psychologists and 
anthropologists are heavily concentrated in the verbal 
group (this includes all of the cultural 
anthropologists). (p. 463) 
 
Roe, as Galton did before her, observes that the direction 
of causality of such differences is unknown: 
My data offer no information on why subjects have come 
to rely on some modes of thinking rather than others. 
Whether there is a hereditary factor, as Galton 
suggested, or whether it is largely training or 
experience, and if so how early and by what means the 
mode is set and how changeable it is are unsolved but 
fascinating problems. (p. 469) 
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Arthur Miller's Imagery in Scientific Thought (1984) 
discusses the central role of imagery in the formation of 
new concepts in 20th century physics, reviewing in 
particular the work and beliefs of Bohr and Boltzmann 
(discussed above), as well as Einstein and Poincare. Of 
Einstein's work, Miller says "the matrix of science, 
philosophy, and technology in which Einstein was educated 
and worked placed a high premium on visual thinking, a mode 
of thought that he preferred for creative scientific 
thinking" (p. 48). 
 
Miller also discusses the tensions during the early 
development of quantum mechanics between the very abstract 
and mathematical, particle-based approach of Heisenberg 
(with any visualization of a particle explicitly rejected) 
and the generally preferred, more concrete and visualizable 
wave mechanics of Schrodinger (the equivalence of the 
different solutions and the wave-particle duality of matter 
were subsequently demonstrated). Miller quotes Schrodinger 
himself: "I knew of . . . [Heisenberg's] theory, of course, 
but felt discouraged not to say repelled, by the methods of 
transcendental algebra, which appeared very difficult to me 
and by the lack of visualizability. . . ." (p. 143) 
 
Similarly, it was with relief that the physics community 
eventually greeted Feynman's now widely accepted 
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diagrammatic approach to quantum theory. Miller attests not 
only to the preference for such a model but to its supposed 
superiority: "It is possible that just as in many cases of 
productive thinking, the problem situation attains a higher 
plateau of clarification once the proper diagram is drawn"      
(p. 257). 
 
Miller's view of the basis of the importance of imagery in 
scientific thinking is similar to what is herein proposed: 
that psychological structure constrains concept formation, 
and this structure is itself constrained by the world of 
sensations and perceptions. Miller presents a statement by 
Poincare on this point:  
"Mr. Russell will tell me no doubt that it is not a 
question of psychology, but of logic and epistemology; 
and I shall be led to answer that there is no logic 
and epistemology independent of psychology." (p. 1) 
 
More specifically, Miller points to the world of sensations 
and perceptions as providing and limiting the material from 
which concepts, at least in physics, can be formed: 
There was general agreement [among physicists] on the 
sorts of models available for representing a theory 
adequately. . . . These pictures were abstracted from 
previous visualizations of objects in the world of 
perceptions. (p. 128) 
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Lightman (1989) makes much the same points: 
Ultimately, we are forced to understand all scientific 
discoveries in terms of the items from daily life -- 
spinning balls, waves in water, pendulums, weights on 
springs. We have no other choice. We cannot avoid 
forming mental pictures when we try to grasp the 
meaning of our equations, and how can we picture what 
we have not seen ? As Einstein said in The Meaning of 
Relativity, "The universe of ideas is just as little 
independent of the nature of our experiences as 
clothes are of the form of the human body." (p. 99) 
 
Miller's discussion of Heisenberg's emphasis on abstraction 
during the early development of quantum mechanics and 
Heisenberg's explicit abandonment at that time of a 
visualizable model, though a minority position, requires 
some further attention. Heisenberg's early successes came 
in the context of the then prevalent and historically 
captivating Bohr model of the atom, which pictures a 
planetary-like structure of electrons orbiting a nucleus. 
Heisenberg correctly saw that this model did not meet the 
experimental data, and that, in fact, no simple picture of 
a concrete electron would do owing (according to Miller's 
description of Heisenberg's thinking at the time) to the 
quantum uncertainties in the electron's position and very 
individuality as a particle. Miller paraphrases and cites 
Heisenberg's own words: 
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In the past we attributed to electrons "the same sort 
of reality as the objects of our daily world; we 
represented to ourselves these basic building blocks 
as extraordinarily small particles of known charge and 
mass but unknown internal structure, which move 
precisely according to fathomable laws in space and 
time and certainly complying with our intuition of the 
familiar continuity of the space-time world." Yet, 
Heisenberg went on, "in the course of time this 
representation has proved to be false." For the 
"electron and the atom possess not any degree of  
direct physical reality as the objects of daily 
experience. . . . The program of quantum mechanics has 
above all to free itself from these intuitive  
pictures. . . . The earlier theory had the benefit of 
direct visualizability . . . ; the new theory ought 
above all to give up totally on visualizability," 
thereby avoiding any internal contradictions. (p. 148) 
According to Miller, "Heisenberg thrived on this mode  of 
thinking" (p. 155), and produced several important results, 
including the famous uncertainty relations.  
 
Early on, Heisenberg was troubled by the non-intuitive (as 
opposed to non-visualizable) aspects of his work, including 
the changes in viewpoint in traditional mechanistic 
causality brought about by probabilistic quantum mechanics 
and the difficulties the data presented for conceiving of 
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anything like a traditional particle located in a 
particular space and time. However, Heisenberg's work on 
the uncertainty relations eventually led him to a re-cast 
point of view that allowed him to claim an intuitive grasp 
of these abstractions. Miller says: "But what sort of 
'intuitive meaning' could Heisenberg have meant when 
previously he had been emphatic on rejecting 
visualizability in the modes of pictures or images?" (p. 
150)  
 
The answer appears to have been as follows: 
In the atomic domain a revision of our usual 
kinematical and mechanical concepts "appears to follow 
directly from the fundamental equations of the quantum 
mechanics. . . ." Since the uncertainty relations 
placed limits on the accuracy to which initial 
conditions could be determined, Heisenberg rejected 
the causal law from classical mechanics that required 
visualization. . . . Thus, concluded Heisenberg, if we 
bear in mind the uncertainty principles, we "should no 
longer regard the quantum mechanics as unintuitive and 
abstract." (p. 150) 
 
Put another way, Heisenberg seems to have adjusted to a 
view of reality dictated by the quantum theory that was not 
based on traditional causality and, as a result, on any 
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easily imagable model, and that he came to see this view as 
both explanatory and intuitive. 
 
This appears to count as some evidence against the broadest 
proposal under consideration -- that imagability is 
necessary for a good explanatory model. However, the damage 
is not as great as it would seem. For one thing, it is not 
clear that Heisenberg clearly embraced a non-imagable 
paradigm (though it was apparently perceived that way at 
the time, and Miller presents it that way). The quantum 
view of a particle (and certainly that of a wave), while 
having many strange attributes, would still seem to derive 
by extension from perceived attributes of real particles, 
and it might be more accurate to say that Heisenberg moved 
from a dominant image -- the Bohr atom -- and certain 
relatively common-sense views on particles and causality to 
admittedly more foreign and less intuitive -- but still 
imagable -- concepts such as the uncertainty of a 
particle's exact location/momentum, or the fact that the 
smallest units of matter sometimes behave as a wave and 
sometimes as a particle (but not in fact both in the same 
experiment, which would indeed be hard to produce an image 
of).  
 
It is also the case that Heisenberg's eventual self-
acclaimed intuitive grasp of a physical reality described 
by quantum mechanics does not automatically confirm it as a 
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valid explanatory model, any more than any other individual 
who claims to now fully understand the origin of the 
universe or the solution of the mind-body problem in any 
particular abstraction. Of course, this is slippery ground, 
in that, in the absence of some objective measure for what 
constitutes a full and satisfactory explanation, it is the 
subjective reports of subjects that count as primary 
evidence. Still, it should be remembered that individual 
disconfirming (or confirming) instances are not conclusive. 
It is worth mentioning in this regard that Heisenberg's 
view of the intuitive reality of quantum mechanics is 
sometimes today challenged; Bernstein (1991, September 26) 
states that "more and more physicists are becoming 
dissatisfied with the conventional formulation of quantum 
mechanics," and Shimony (1991) claims that "the abandonment 
of a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics of 
physical systems"  -- i.e., that "there is no quantum world 
. . . only an abstract quantum physical description" -- is 
an increasingly familiar point of view (p. 523). 
 
It would have been interesting to test Heisenberg's level 
of imagery vividness and use of imagery. Even if his 
theorizing is viewed as disconfirming the stronger proposal 
that an imagable model is necessary for explanation, it 
would very possibly have served as another point of 
confirmation of the general individual difference 
hypothesis that low imagery use/vividness is correlated 
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with belief in the possibility (and, for Heisenberg, the 
actuality, to some extent) of abstract explanations of 
physical phenomena.   
 
Many contemporary physicists have written about the 
importance of imagery in their work (e.g., Penrose, 1989). 
(This is of course of limited statistical value; there do 
not seem to be too many first-hand accounts by physicists 
who expressly do not make use of images, and one would not 
expect the negative position to be considered as 
interesting to report.) A slightly broader accounting of 
the current use of imagery among physicists can be found in 
the Cosmology Interview Project conducted by Lightman and 
Brawer (1987-1989, by permission of the Niels Bohr Library, 
Center for History of Physics, American Institute of 
Physics; and 1990). This consisted of in-depth interviews 
with 27 leading cosmologists over the period 1987 to 1989. 
The goal of the study to date has been to extract data (the 
one published work, Lightman and Brawer, 1990, is largely 
unanalyzed extracts from the transcribed interviews) that 
would shed light on "the ways in which personal, 
philosophical, and psychological factors enter the 
scientific progress" (1987-1989, p. 2).  
 
Lightman and Brawer asked a fairly standard set of 
questions about early childhood experiences, motivations 
and approaches in studying cosmology and views on specific 
51 
cosmological questions. One set of questions that was asked 
of most of the subjects concerned their use of imagery: 
whether they used visual images in thinking about 
cosmological problems, whether they ever tried to visualize 
the Big Bang, etc. As the work by Galton, Roe and others 
discussed above would lead us to believe (though contrary 
to Galton's finding that "most" scientists were unfamiliar 
with imagery), there was considerable variability in the 
responses, with 13 indicating they did use visual images to 
varying degrees, and 6 responding that they basically did 
not use them. Here is a sampling (from the original 
interviews, 1987-1989; page numbers are the number within 
each individual interview) of the responses of several of 
the cosmologists about the use of imagery (sometimes 
together with the interviewer's question), as well as some 
of the responses about the problem of the origin of the 
universe (the latter was not standardly pursued but came up 
at various times in the interviews; the responses were not 
numerous enough to correlate with the reports of the use of 
imagery): 
     Dicke: There's still one point in cosmology that 
I find very disagreeable, and that's the idea of time 
and space having no meaning up to a certain point and 
then suddenly appearing. A universe which is suddenly 
switched on I find highly disagreeable. (p. 13) 
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     Geller: I don't have a vivid image of the Big 
Bang itself. . . . The things I understand very well, 
I probably have some level of visual image. And the 
Big Bang, I mean I have some images, but they're not 
images that are particularly vivid. (p. 14) 
 
     Lightman: . . . do you find that you use visual 
images much in your work ? 
 Gunn: Oh, quite a lot. That also is something 
that happens more and more as you get older . . . -- 
you rely on mental pictures. But I always have, to a 
very large extent. . . . Unless I can make an image 
for something, I don't really feel that I understand 
it. There are dangers in that because you can often 
make images that are not right. (p. 16) 
 
 Guth: . . . I think it's very possible that the 
universe is a quantum fluctuation starting from 
absolutely nothing. . . . 
 Lightman: . . . If the universe began as a 
quantum fluctuation, what was there before the 
fluctuation ? How do you think about that ? 
 Guth: OK, I can tell you the image I use for 
that, although I'm not sure it will hold up in time. 
What I think now is that . . . there will be a space 
of all the possible states of the universe . . . and 
among all of those states . . . I assume that one of 
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the possibilities is a . . . universe with its radius 
equal to zero or something like that. . . . 
 Lightman: Then what meaning do you give to the 
words "the universe came into being?" Does that just 
mean that a particular universe changed from      
having . . . zero radius to having a finite radius ? 
 Guth: Actually, it probably has no precise 
meaning. . . . I think that once you get down toward 
the beginning of the universe . . . you really should 
not talk about the universe beginning at a time. (p. 
10-11) 
 
 Hawking: I really have to be able to visualize a 
problem. (p. 3) 
 
Lightman: Are visual images important to you in your 
actual research . . . ? 
 Hoyle: No. I was never a very good geometer. I 
had to do all my geometry algebraically. I'm not very 
good at visual imagery. (p. 19)  
 
 Lightman: I know there have been certain 
physicists in the past who have used images and 
visualization and pictures more than other physicists. 
I think Einstein used a lot of visual images. . . . 
One question that I've been very interested in, and 
some psychologists are interested in too, is how 
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physicists use mental pictures. Maybe not exactly 
pictures but, for example, the way we say in quantum 
mechanics that sometimes things act as particles and 
sometimes as waves. I guess we're attempting to make a 
connection to our daily experience with the world. How 
do you use images in your work? Do you find images 
useful or harmful? 
 Linde: Typically, I just use them. (pp. 3-4)      
[Note Lightman's point -- similar to the point made 
above that the renouncement of visualization for 
quantum mechanics is not really complete -- that the 
underlying model(s) of quantum mechanics draw on 
common-sense (imagable) constructs] 
 
 Lightman: . . . do you use visual images much in 
your own work ? 
 Peebles: Yes I do. . . . I don't know -- how else 
do you think, besides in images? (p. 18) 
 
 Lightman: . . . do you use visual images a lot ? 
 Ostriker: Yes. . . . There was a volume in honor 
of Stan Ulam. . . . He commented . . . that physicists 
always think in just pictures first. . . . [Not 
apparently true] 
 Lightman: You think that helps you work on 
problems? 
55 
 Ostriker: I wouldn't even make it as weak as 
that. It's essential. (p. 21) 
 
A final interesting point: when Lightman was questioned 
about why he did not ask all the interviewees about their 
use of imagery (as determined by a reading of the complete 
transcripts), Lightman responded that he stopped asking 
these questions part way through the interviews because 
"many scientists don't use visual images and those that do 
seem to have trouble articulating the experience" 
(Lightman, personal correspondence, August 8, 1991). This 
again attests to the variability in imagery usage but also 
to the difficulty collecting reliable and useful data about 
such usage.   
 
 
Individual Differences in Imagery 
 
Relevant work on individual differences in imagery has been 
mostly focused on demonstrating a functional role for 
imagery in problem solving and concept formation and on the 
link between imagery and creativity, as well as some more 
general studies on the nature and extent of individual 
differences with regard to memory. Imagery ability has most 
often been defined as imagery vividness, and is typically 
measured either by Betts's (1909) Questionnaire upon Mental 
Imagery (QMI) or by Marks's (1973) Vividness of Visual 
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Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ). Some work has also focused on 
the role of imagery frequency. Such studies have also tried 
to demonstrate what factors limit or enhance the role of 
imagery, including stimulus attributes and familiarity and 
instructions/priming to use imagery. Finally, while the 
emphasis has been on the facilitative role of imagery, 
several studies have shown that imagery can sometimes 
retard performance. 
 
The following review will focus on the central works in 
each of the above areas. General recent surveys of the 
imagery literature (though not touching all of the areas of 
interest here) can be found in Ernest (1977) and Reisberg, 
Culver, Heuer & Fischman (1986). Forisha (1978) has 
surveyed work on imagery and creativity. 
 
Imagery in Problem Solving and Concept Formation 
 
In a study typical of those demonstrating a functional role 
for imagery, Ashton, McFarland, Walsh and White (1978) 
repeated the well known study of Cooper and Shepard (1975) 
on hand recognition but examined the role of imagery 
vividness, which Cooper and Shepard did not consider. Level 
of imagery vividness of subjects was measured using Betts's 
QMI, and groups of high, medium and low imagers were 
constructed, each with two right and two left handers.  
Line drawings of a hand were then tachistoscopically 
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presented to subjects, with the hand presented being either 
the right hand or left hand, front or back view and in any 
of six orientations (upright, 60 degrees from upright, 120 
degrees from upright, upside down, etc.). The stimulus was 
preceded either by a 2 sec. blank field or by 2 sec. of a 
thumbless outline of a hand in the same orientation as the 
stimulus hand. Subjects were in addition sometimes 
"instructed to imagine one of the four versions of the 
human hand (left/right, front/back) as being superimposed" 
(p. 256) over the thumbless outline. Reaction time was 
measured from presentation to correct identification of the 
stimulus as either a right or left hand.  
 
Results showed that high imagers had shorter reaction times 
than medium imagers, who had shorter reaction times than 
low imagers. In addition, reaction times were shorter in 
the imagery instruction (vs. the no instruction) trials. 
Interestingly, in a second experiment in which no imagery 
instructions were presented at any time, there was no 
significant difference based on imagery vividness. Ashton 
et al. conclude that imagery ability is important but only 
when use of imagery is suggested; it appears that high 
imagery ability does not by itself automatically lead to 
its usage in a problem-solving situation. 
 
Ashton et al. also found that the effects of imagery 
differences were most pronounced for unusual hand 
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orientations, and least observed at the 0 and 360 degree 
positions. This led them to suggest that the functional 
demonstration of individual differences imagery depends not 
only on instructions to use imagery but also on task 
unfamiliarity, with familiar tasks presumably capable of 
being performed regardless of imagery ability.  
 
DeSoto, London & Handel (1965) also demonstrated a 
functional role for imagery, reporting that when subjects 
solve 3-term problems -- e.g., given that Tom is taller 
than Sam and John is shorter than Sam, who is the tallest ? 
-- subjects reported creating images of spatial arrays of 
the items, arranging them in the order given by the 
premises and then inspecting the array to provide the 
problem solution. Huttenlocher (1968) further showed that 
the latencies and number of errors recorded for such 
problems are "parallel [to] their mental operations in 
determining the place of a real item in a spatial array 
from a verbal description" (p. 555).  
 
Also working with 3-term problems, Shaver, Pierson and Lang 
(1974) reported that a significant majority of their 
subjects claimed to use a spatial approach to solving the 
problems. In addition, Shaver et al. showed that: 
 1. Subjects with better scores on spatial-reasoning 
tests (from Thurstone's Chicago Tests of Primary Mental 
Abilities) made fewer errors (at least for men, while the 
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findings for women were not statistically significant; we 
shall continue to see occasional though hard to explain 
gender differences in such studies) 
 2. Problems in which the relation among the terms was 
spatial (e.g., above/below vs. lighter/darker) were easier 
to solve. 
 3. Instructions to use imagery were again significant, 
with fewer errors reported when users were explicitly 
instructed to use imagery. 
 
Despite the numerous reports in the psychological and 
anecdotal literature on the use of imagery in problem-
solving, Kosslyn, Seger, Pani & Hillger (1990), reviewing 
the results of a set of diaries kept by subjects describing 
images as they occurred throughout the day, found that 
"relatively few images were reported to be used in the 
service of what we took to be the primary purposes of 
imagery, that is, recall and mental simulation" (p. 150). 
Of course, as Kosslyn et al. observe, much of any given day 
is spent in fairly mundane activities, so it is perhaps not 
surprising that when all of the imagery that transpires is 
chronicled, only a small part is seen as purposeful. 
Kosslyn et al. did find that vivid imagers (the top half of 
the group as measured by the VVIQ) had a statistically 
significant greater number of images per day (16) than 
those with less vivid imagery (12). 
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Katz (1983) cites work showing that desensitization therapy 
involving imagery is more effective among those scoring 
higher on subjective (unspecified) measures of imagery. 
However, when the mode of the therapy was based on verbal 
self-instructions, high imagers did worse, again showing 
the importance of instructions and suggesting an 
interfering effect of imagery. 
 
Interference by imagery in certain kinds of concept 
learning was also demonstrated by Hollenberg (1970). 
Hollenberg reasoned that children with good imagery ability 
would learn the names of objects more quickly than weak 
imagers since the ability to mentally reconstruct a picture 
of an object would allow "silent rehearsal and 
solidification of the object-label tie" (p. 1004). However, 
Hollenberg hypothesized that weaker imagers would grasp 
"concepts underlying the application of verbal labels more 
quickly than children who have strong imagery" since 
"visual imagery, by preserving so vividly the perceptual 
aspects of experience, might act to focus attention and 
recall on perceptual similarities among objects and thereby 
impede the acquisition of the meaning categories underlying 
language" (p. 1005)".  
 
Hollenberg presented 64 children from grades 1 through 4 
with a battery of tests aimed to measure how much the 
children relied on visual imagery in problem-solving. In 
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order to test the hypothesis that high imagers would learn 
names more quickly, the children were then presented 
nonsense names for pictures of 4 objects, and then asked to 
identify the pictures in different orderings, with 
incorrect results being corrected; the names were 
considered learned when there were 3 consecutive sets of 
error-free identifications. For the hypothesis that low 
imagers would have superior concept attainment, Hollenberg 
then showed the subjects a series of additional pictures of 
objects each of which had some conceptual group 
identification with one of the original pictures, and asked 
subjects to guess which of the learned nonsense names 
applied to them. The subjects' responses were corrected, 
and the trials repeated with new pictures until once again 
a certain level of error-free response was reached.  
 
Hollenberg's results basically confirmed her hypotheses. 
High-imagery children required fewer trials to learn the 
nonsense names than did low-imagery children at most grade 
levels, and in general showed less difference between grade 
levels than did the low-imagery children, who could be seen 
to more significantly improve with increasing grade-level. 
The results for concept learning were more pronounced, with 
low-imagery children clearly requiring fewer trials up to 
the 4th grade, at which point the differences between low- 
and high-imagery groups seemed to disappear; Hollenberg 
suggests that by this time the high-imagery children had 
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learned alternative compensating strategies for concept 
attainment. 
 
There is a significant body of work by Paivio and others 
showing that stimulus imagability itself (vs. imagery 
ability of the individual) facilitates learning and recall; 
indeed, Paivio has said that stimulus imagability is "the 
best single predictor of associate learning involving 
meaningful material that we have been able to identify" 
(Paivio, 1970, p. 389). The proposed explanation for this 
is as follows: 
High-imagery, or concrete, stimulus terms such as 
"house" function as efficient stimulus "pegs" from 
which associates can be hung and retrieved by means of 
mediating images. To use Kohler's example, when a pair 
such as "sugar-lake" is presented, it evokes a 
compound spatial image. When the stimulus word "sugar" 
is presented on the test trial, it evokes the compound 
image of the sugar in the lake, which in turn mediates 
the overt response "lake". . . . This hypothesis 
generated the prediction that concreteness or image-
evoking value would have a greater effect when varied 
on the stimulus side than on the response side of 
pairs in paired-associate learning, for it is the 
stimulus term that must reinstitute the mediating 
image on the recall trial. This prediction has been 
repeatedly confirmed in a series of experiments. . . . 
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[quotation marks replace italics in the original] (pp. 
387-388) 
 
Imagery and Creativity 
 
Schmeidler (1965), working from a psychodynamic perspective 
that equates visual imagery with the primary process 
thinking of the unconscious, investigated the hypothesis 
that creative individuals are more likely to admit such 
primary process material into their consciousness, as 
measured by the greater vividness of their visual imagery. 
Schmeidler tested 307 college students for imagery 
vividness and creativity, using a modified version of 
Galton's breakfast-table questionnaire to test imagery 
vividness and using the Barron Independence of Judgment 
Scale, produced by interviews and tests of creative and 
non-creative workers in the same field, to test creativity. 
The results showed a significant correlation (r = .21, p = 
.008) between imagery vividness and creativity. 
Interestingly, "no Ss with very high imagery scores had 
very low creativity scores" (p. 78), though there were very 
creative individuals with low imagery scores. 
 
Shaw and DeMers (1986) tested both academically gifted and 
normal fifth and sixth grade students for imagery vividness 
(using the VVIQ and additional tests for visual memory and 
visual imagery control) and creativity (using the battery 
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of tests developed by Torrance). Results showed a positive 
relationship between imagery control and originality and 
flexibility (two of the more qualitative sub-scores of the 
creativity tests), especially among high-IQ subjects and 
especially between the VVIQ and originality. No gender 
differences were found. 
 
Forisha (1981) administered imagery and creativity tests to 
320 college students (both undergraduate and graduate). The 
imagery tests consisted of an adaptation of the QMI plus an 
imagery control questionnaire, and the creativity tests 
consisted of Torrance's Unusual Uses Subtest and four 
Thematic Apperception Test cards, scored by Stewart's 
Psychological Adaptation to the Environment Scale. Results 
showed a significant correlation in total imagery and 
creativity scores for the entire sample, as well as for 
several subsets of the sample; correlations were strongest 
in psychology and business majors for males (vs. 
engineering and education) and in education for females. 
Regression equations showed a significant contribution to 
creativity by imagery. However, as has often been the case, 
there was the suggestion of a negative imagery effect as 
well: a factor analysis turned up two factors on which 
imagery and creativity were highly loaded, and on one of 
these factors they were loaded in opposite directions. 
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Forisha (1978) also reports on some earlier work of hers 
that shows mixed or inconsistent results. In one study, 
there were clear negative correlations for men between 
imagery vividness and a number of creativity sub-scores, 
while women showed non-significant positive correlations. A 
second study showed no significant correlations for men and 
numerous significant correlations for women. Forisha also 
compares such inconsistencies (and some reported elsewhere) 
with the numerous anecdotal and subjective reports (e.g., 
Poincare, Einstein, Nietzsche, Arthur Koeslter and others) 
attesting to the role of visual and auditory imagery in 
forming ideas, though here too, as we have seen, there is 
often the suggestion (or more) of a possible negative role 
for imagery. Forisha speculates that a possible basis for 
such inconsistencies is an interaction between specific 
imagery abilities (vividness, flexibility, etc.) and stage 
of personality development, as described in works such as 
those by Witkin and Maslow:   
Consistent findings for women of a low, positive 
relationship between creativity and imagery are in 
accord with the hypothesis that women are more aware 
of their imagery and that imagery may play a more 
integrated role in their cognitive processes. This 
agrees with the theory that women, even creative 
women, are more autocentric in their thinking, more 
inner-oriented, and more receptive to unconscious 
processes. The contradictory findings for men indicate 
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that this is not so in a male sample and that other 
moderating variables are at work. Such variables as 
field dependence and independence, imagery rigidity 
and flexibility, autonomy and control, as well as the 
men's conscious direction of attention . . . are all 
suggested variables. Speculating further, in a sample 
of moderately creative individuals one would expect to 
find more "differentiated" male personalities in which 
imagery is neither a continuous nor very welcome 
counterpoint to verbal and rational objectivity. 
Hence, such imagery might become an obstruction to 
both abstract and creative thinking. 
     On the other hand, in a sample of either highly 
creative men or the ones particularly selected because 
of humanistic interest, one might expect to encounter 
more of an awareness and utilization of imagery. The 
results described above indicate that this might be 
so. In men who are integrated rather than 
differentiated, or who are more open to humanistic 
concerns, one is more likely to find an awareness and 
utilization of imagery in furthering creative thought. 
(p. 231-232) 
 
This evokes Galton's comment (presented above) that, 
despite the lack of imagery among large numbers of talented 
people, imagery is still likely a component of the "highest 
minds": 
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The highest minds are probably those in which it [the 
faculty of seeing the pictures] is not lost, but 
subordinated, and is ready for use on suitable 
occasions. (Galton, 1883, p. 88) 
 
Similarly, there is Bartlett's remark that "the image 
method remains the method of brilliant discovery" (1932, p. 
226). 
 
Imagery and Memory 
 
The literature studying the relationship between imagery 
and memory contains many significant findings but also a 
number of inconsistencies. Marks (1973), in the work that 
introduced the VVIQ, found that good imagers were better in 
recalling incidental details (e.g., the number on a golf 
ball) of color photographs. Gur and Hilgard (1975) found 
that subjects with more vivid imagery as measured by the 
VVIQ had shorter reaction times in identifying differences 
between two versions of a picture, with pairs of pictures 
presented both simultaneously and successively.  
 
Slee (1980) found that vividness (as measured by the Visual 
Elaboration Scale, or V.E.S., an instrument designed by 
Slee) correlated with recall in a number of appearance-
related tasks, including recall of a line drawing differing 
in only small structural details from another. On the other 
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hand, Slee found no relationship between vividness and a 
number of recognition tasks, nor between vividness and 
certain kinds of reconstruction of ambiguous figures in 
which there was a clear conceptual interpretation. Slee 
interprets the lack of an imagery/recognition (vs. 
imagery/recall) relationship as supporting the view that 
imagery is related only to the "temporary retrieval and 
conscious representation [of information] and not to its 
storage" (p. 112). Slee sees the lack of a relationship in 
the presence of a conceptual representation as indicating 
the following: 
Visual imagery has no special role with respect to 
information corresponding with a prior conceptual 
interpretation of a configuration, but . . . it has a 
more or less unique role with respect to information 
corresponding with detailed features of visual 
structure. (p. 111) 
 
There are many studies that have found no relationship 
between vividness and recall, and some that have found 
inverse relationships. Berger & Gaunitz (1977) performed 
experiments similar to those of Marks and of Gur and 
Hilgard. Imagery vividness was measured with the VVIQ, and 
subjects had to determine whether two successively 
presented pictures were either identical or only very 
similar. In addition, Berger & Gaunitz attempted to control 
for a number of demand characteristics and other possible 
69 
confounding variables not explicitly controlled for in the 
earlier works, including experimenter and subject knowledge 
of the VVIQ score and when the VVIQ was administered (half 
were tested before the trials, half afterwards). The 
results indicated no significant relationship between 
vividness and accuracy of difference judgments. 
 
Reisberg, Culver, Heuer & Fischman (1986) found a clear 
inverse relationship between imagery vividness and both 
long-term incidental and short-term intentional memory for 
colors, with vivid imagers doing significantly worse. 
Reisberg et al. argue that this is because vivid imagers 
can more easily imagine any color as the correct answer, 
and therefore are more readily lured into mistakenly 
identifying some color as the correct one. They further 
argue that much of the inconsistency in the literature can 
be attributed to a failure to distinguish between visual 
tasks (such as theirs), which many studies show are related 
to vividness (though few modern empirical studies 
demonstrate the inverse relationship they have found) and 
spatial tasks, which tend not to show a relationship to 
vividness. However, even within their own review of the 
literature there are findings unexplained by such a 
hypothesis.  
 
Cohen & Saslona (1990) found a positive correlation between 
subjects' reported frequency of visual imagery and recall 
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of incidentally viewed colors, but no correlation between 
vividness (using the VVIQ) and frequency or between 
vividness and color recall, and vividness was inversely 
correlated with recall of location information. Imagery 
frequency was measured using items from Paivio's Individual 
Differences Questionnaire, or IDQ (1971), that Paivio later 
found loaded highly on a frequency of imagery factor 
(Paivio, 1983). Work by Heueur, Fischman and Reisberg 
(1986), using essentially the same instruments, also 
demonstrated no relationship between frequency and 
vividness. There is also, as Cohen and Saslona report, some 
support in the early survey by Griffitts (1927) of 
individual differences in imagery for the independence (at 
least as factors) of imagery frequency and vividness, in 
that Griffitts found some individuals for whom visual 
imagery was dominant (vs. auditory or other types of 
imagery) but very unclear. (Cohen and Saslona fail to 
mention that Griffitts nevertheless found a strong positive 
correlation between dominance of a particular type of 
imagery and the clarity of that imagery.)   
 
From this Cohen and Saslona argue for the utility of 
imagery frequency (vs. vividness) as a facilitator of 
certain tasks, and for the confusion of frequency and 
vividness as a partial explanation (to the extent the two 
are confounded in some tests, such as Paivio's original 
IDQ) for the inconsistent results in the individual 
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differences literature. Cohen and Saslona suggest (but 
leave unresolved) two possible mechanisms for the effects 
of imagery frequency: "It is not clear . . . whether 
[frequent] visualizers encode visual information more 
'automatically,' pay more attention to visual aspects . . . 
or have a greater facility for recalling visual information 
once encoded" (p. 111). 
 
The demonstrated importance of imagery frequency strikes a 
resonant note with the literature on imagery in scientific 
reasoning, where it is often imagery usage (vs. or at least 
not clearly distinguished from vividness) that is 
mentioned, though the lack of a relationship between 
frequency and vividness is a little surprising on a priori 
grounds if we assume the validity of the vividness measures 
(which Cohen & Saslona don't especially; see just below). 
 
Furthermore, picking up on a rejected speculation by 
Reisberg et al., Cohen & Saslona speculate that their 
finding of an inverse relationship between vividness and 
location recall is due to subject over-confidence. Reisberg 
et al. mention the limitations of introspective self-
report, especially as that might be adequate to explain 
only small correlations, but basically accept the validity 
of such a measure. Cohen and Saslona, however, point out 
that those scoring the highest vividness scores on the VVIQ 
have fairly frequently chosen (both in their study and 
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others) the option labeled "perfectly clear and as vivid as 
normal vision" (p. 110) for describing some of their 
images, a description which seems (to Cohen & Saslona, at 
least) fairly unlikely to be true as often as it is 
reported (if indeed it is ever true, in their opinion) by 
such vivid imagers. This suggests that such subjects may be 
more indicating their confidence in their imagery (or 
themselves) rather than its vividness, and doing this 
despite any errors in their imagery.  
 
Such over-confidence, Cohen & Saslona reason, would be 
inappropriate for their fairly difficult spatial location 
discrimination, resulting in poorer performance for such 
subjects. Similarly, the argument continues, in those cases 
where (over-) confidence is less relevant or perhaps even a 
useful motivator, such vivid imagers might be expected to 
do the same or better, respectively, than less vivid 
imagers. (A few studies are mentioned as possibly 
supporting this point of view but it is basically left as a 
speculation requiring further research.) 
 
 
Differences between Novices and Experts 
 
Differences in Encoding and Recall  
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Much of the early and most familiar work in this area 
describes the differences between novices and experts in 
their ability to encode and recall information from a given 
problem space. deGroot (1965) presented chess positions to 
experts and novices for a few seconds and then removed the 
pieces, and found that experts could correctly replace a 
much larger number of pieces than novices. When the pieces 
were arranged randomly, there was no novice/expert 
difference, suggesting a chunking by the experts of 
individual pieces in the actual games' positions into 
larger meaningful units.  
 
Similarly, Chase and Simon (1973) found that expert chess 
players attempting to reconstruct a game position tended to 
do so in chunks of chess-meaningful units, and concluded 
from this and other studies that  "the ability to perceive 
familiar patterns quickly . . . [is] the basic ability 
underlying chess skill" (p. 267). 
 
These findings have been replicated in a number of domains, 
including computer programming (e.g., McKeithen, Reitman, 
Rueter and Hirtle, 1981) and bridge (Charness, 1979). 
 
Differences in Categorization and Representation 
 
Work on psychological diagnosis by Murphy and Wright (1984) 
found that expert categories were richer and more complex 
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than those of novices, if sometimes fuzzier. In physics, 
Chi, Feltovich and Glaser (1981) found that expert problem 
representation was often based on more abstract and 
functional relationships than on the superficial attributes 
used by novices.  
 
As discussed fully above, Larkin (1983) showed that problem 
representation differed significantly between experts and 
novices, with novice representations consisting of real-
world objects and expert representations consisting of both 
these and "fictitious" technical entities, though such 
technical entities nevertheless tended to be based on 
imagable constructs. 
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Differences in Reasoning 
 
Larkin, McDermott, Simon and Simon (1980) showed that, 
while solving problems in physics, experts tended to reason 
forwards from the data at hand, using appropriate physics 
principles, while novices tended to work backwards from a 
stated goal or unknown value in an equation, sometimes in 
more or less trial-and-error fashion. Similarly, Patel and 
Groen (1986) found that cardiologists making a correct 
diagnosis from a written description of a case used bottom-
up (i.e., from the data given) forward reasoning, while 
those with inaccurate diagnoses (also experts) used a 
mixture of backward and forward reasoning. (In more design-
oriented tasks, such as computer programming, such forward 
reasoning may not be possible, and even experts will need 
to work backwards from a goal; see Koedinger & Anderson, 
1990, for a brief discussion.) 
 
Naive Theories 
 
There has been considerable research aimed at showing that 
novice performance can be explained by appeal to consistent 
naive theories that result from innate cognitive structure 
and/or everyday experience. In a series of studies, 
McCloskey and others (McCloskey, Caramazza and Green, 1980; 
Caramazza, McCloskey and Green, 1981; McCloskey, 1983) have 
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provided evidence that people develop through everyday 
interaction a naive and consistent theory of motion that 
is, however, inconsistent with the laws of physics, and in 
fact resembles a pre-Newtonian physical theory ("impetus 
theory") developed several hundred years ago. These studies 
have shown that this theory is strongly held and not easily 
changed, as demonstrated by its persistence even among 
college physics majors.  
 
Additional evidence for the existence of such naive 
theories is provided for Aristotelian dynamics by diSessa 
(1982) and White (1983); for wheel dynamics by Proffitt, 
Kaiser and Whelan (1990); and for naive statics by Roncato 
and Rumiati (1986). In addition, several researchers (e.g., 
Wellman and Gelman, 1988, and Keil, 1989) have made the 
related case for the existence of consistent (if 
scientifically inaccurate) theories in the reasoning of 
young children. 
 
Kaiser, Jonides and Alexander (1986), examining McCloskey's 
initial findings, present evidence that naive subjects were 
more successful with similar motion problems when the 
problems evoked familiar motion events and were less 
artificial (though formally equivalent) to those in 
McCloskey's work. Kaiser et al. also found that such 
success failed to generalize to the more abstract problems.  
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This leads Kaiser et al. to propose a two-stage approach to 
solving such problems: first, subjects search for a 
solution based on past experiences; and then, only if that 
fails do they go on to draw on often faulty formal 
theoretical notions. Given such a model, the ability to 
solve familiar problems does not benefit later attempts to 
solve more abstract and artificial ones because the 
familiar ones, solved on a very concrete level, do not 
provide for the sort of similarity mapping to the formal 
(non-concrete) analysis of the abstract problems that 
analogy-based transference would require (as laid out, for 
example, in the discussion of reasoning through analogy by 
Gentner, 1982). 
 
Similarly, Roncato and Rumiati (1986) speculate that naive 
concepts are "procedurally encoded" (to use the distinction 
between procedural and declarative knowledge discussed by 
Winograd, 1975, and others), making them both efficient and 
resistant to change, and are used whenever a problem 
situation either resembles the context of acquisition of 
the naive concepts or when the taught, formal (and 
putatively "declarative") knowledge of the situation is 
incomplete (as would be for McCloskey's novice subjects). 
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When Experts Don't Do Better than Novices 
 
Expertise does not always result in better performance. 
Frensch and Sternberg (1988), studying the effect of 
variant bridge rules on novice and expert players, found 
that experts adapted more poorly to a deep structural 
change in the game than did novices, causing them to 
conclude that the increased proceduralization and 
automatization characteristic of expertise (as 
demonstrated, for example, in Anderson, 1983) can in 
certain cases result in less flexibility for experts in the 
domain of expertise.  
 
Adelson (1984) showed that novice computer programmers can 
outperform experts when the task is oriented around the 
surface structure of a program rather than the deeper, more 
abstract structure that other studies have shown to 
characterize and perhaps explain some of the success of 
experts. 
 
Finally, Lewis (1981) found little difference in the 
performance of novices and experts in the solution of 
algebraic equations, observing that the numerous mistakes 
of experts may be due to the lack of incentive to excel at 
the relatively mundane task of solving equations. 
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Despite showing poorer or unimproved performance by 
experts, none of these studies actually contradict any 
earlier work but, in effect, demonstrate situations in 
which the characteristics of experts believed instrumental 
to their success are either irrelevant or tend to work 
against them. 
 
Other Explanations of Novice/Expert Differences 
 
One possible explanation for some of the demonstrated 
differences between novices and experts is a difference 
between such groups in individual attributes other than 
expertise, particularly differences in aptitude. However, 
Schoenfeld and Hermann (1982) studied students before and 
after a course in mathematical problem-solving (together 
with students in a control group that were enrolled in a 
different course), and demonstrated that the perceptual 
changes characteristic of expertise were produced as a 
result of the students' acquisition of expertise. Ceci and 
Liker (1986) also showed that aptitude (specifically, IQ) 
was unrelated to the complex expertise demonstrated by 
expert horse race handicappers. 
 
 
Philosophical Perspectives 
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A question to be considered is what sort of causation or 
kind of explanation is being appealed to in the claim that 
explanatory constructs must be perception-based. There is 
today no clear philosophical consensus on the concepts of 
causation and explanation. Following Boyd (1991), we can 
sketch out three broad approaches in recent philosophy of 
science on the general nature of scientific knowledge and 
explanation: (a) logical empiricism (sometimes known as 
logical positivism), (b) scientific realism and  
(c) constructivism.  
 
Logical empiricism arose early in the 20th century as a 
descendant of an empirical tradition going back at least as 
far as Hume. A central tenet of logical empiricism is 
verificationism, which grounds the meaning of a theory or 
explanation "with the set of procedures by which it can be 
tested and thus verified or disconfirmed" (Boyd, p. 5). 
References to unobservables or metaphysical entities are 
considered meaningless; the content of scientific theories 
is to be found strictly in the predictions of observable 
phenomena. Any unobservables that are used in the theories 
are simply models assisting in such predictions; no 
existential weight is given to the unobservable objects 
(e.g., atoms) of these models. A closely related point of 
view, operationalism, attempts to formally define 
theoretical terms by the laboratory procedures or 
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operations that measure them and that, it is viewed, give 
them their only meaning. 
 
The verificationist (and, more broadly, empirical) view of 
explanation is often referred to as the "covering-law model 
of explanation" (sometimes known as the deductive-
nomological model), which, as described by Gasper (1991) 
states the following: 
An event of a certain kind is explained by citing a 
general law (or laws) that relates events of that kind 
to events or conditions of some other kind and showing 
that events or conditions of the latter kind took 
place or were in effect. (p. 291) 
 
Thus, events are explained by appeal to certain general 
laws and to background, observable conditions. This is an 
intuitive approach that reaches back to Hume's assertion 
that causation is a matter of "constant conjunction," or 
the idea that "one event is the cause of another . . . [if] 
events like the first one are always (or usually, or 
typically) followed by events like the second" (Gasper, p. 
290; this is also similar to the common-sense, though, 
viewed philosophically, inadequate approach to causation 
based on necessary and sufficient conditions). Within such 
a model, an explanation has the same structure as a 
prediction:  
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If we have an adequate explanation of some occurrence, 
then, in principle, we could have predicted it before 
it actually took place. . . . A theory that provides 
us with good explanations is confirmed in exactly the 
same was as one that yields true predictions. (pp. 
291-292) 
 
But as Gasper points out, there are several problems with 
this model, problems now "widely (though by no means 
universally) regarded by contemporary philosophers of 
science as decisive" (p. 292). One problem is whether it is 
really possible to come up with the general laws needed 
without making mention of unobservable entities or "causal 
factors" ruled out by the basic verificationist 
assumptions. A second problem relates to "asymmetries of 
explanation": 
Many mathematical laws link events in such a way that, 
given information about either one, information about 
the other can be derived. Thus, given the laws of 
optics, the position of the sun and the height of a 
certain flagpole, we can calculate the length of the 
shadow that the flagpole will cast. Here, the 
covering-law model conforms with out intuition that 
the height of the flagpole explains the length of the 
shadow. But, given the length of the shadow and the 
other information, we can equally calculate the height 
of the flagpole. In terms of the covering-law model, 
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the two cases are parallel, yet it seems that we would 
not want to say that the length of the shadow explains 
the height of the flagpole. (Gasper, p. 292) 
 
Of interest in this criticism of the covering-law model is 
the recognition of what could be considered a psychological 
sense of causation/explanation -- over and above the 
formalism of the explanation -- that is violated, and hence 
unexplained by the formal model. In addition, the covering-
law model of explanation, with its rejection of 
unobservables, provides at least indirect support for the 
importance of imagability, in that one could argue that, to 
the extent unobservables might be at all admitted, they 
must be, as it were, observable (imagable) in principle, 
and unobservable in practice only contingently (e.g., by 
being too small for the resolution of human eyes).  
 
Today, verificationism and its related forms are far less 
influential (though the covering-law model continues to 
have influence even among those who do not subscribe to a 
verificationist position). The complete elimination of the 
real existence of all unobservable objects -- the 
"elimination of metaphysics" -- is considered by many as 
unacceptable, and attempts to explain and limit scientific 
practice to specific unchanging procedures is regarded as 
inconsistent with actual scientific practice, in which 
scientists are always changing their procedures to improve 
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measurement of "the sorts of theoretical entities or 
properties reference to which operationalism is supposed to 
eliminate" (Boyd, p. 9).  
 
One reaction to logical empiricism, and an influential view 
among philosophers today, is scientific realism, which 
posits the existence of a reality, including potentially 
unobservable objects, independent of any particular theory 
or measurement. A good theory or measurement describes this 
reality relatively well, while a poor one does not. 
 
From a realist perspective, the sources of explanation are 
to be determined by the scientific process itself, and may 
well include reference to unobservable entities (to the 
extent a good theory is dependent on them) that are 
considered to be "real," among other naturally occurring 
objects. Harre (1988) goes further, and points out that, 
eventually, explanations must terminate (on pain of 
infinite regress) with objects that have intrinsic "causal 
powers": 
At the end of every explanatory regress we must 
perforce shift from causal mechanisms to causal 
powers. So far as we know there is no further level of 
"mechanism" which will explain the behaviour of 
quarks. If they exist then their properties are indeed 
basic dispositions, unanalysable causal powers. 
Gravity may also be a referent of last resort, 
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explanatorily. To explain the behavior of falling 
bodies by reference to gravitational potential may be 
to cite a basic causal power. (p. 142) 
 
The view that explanation is perception-based is especially 
consonant with a realist perspective that confers an 
independent physical existence to objects on both sides of 
an explanatory relationship. Harre makes the point 
explicitly, observing that real causes, if unobservable, 
must be imagined (though the example is from the scientific 
explanation of evolution, a very different kind of 
phenomenon, a similar point could presumably be pressed 
about a more immediate physical phenomenon); 
What was the mechanism of evolution ? It was no good 
making any more observations or collecting any more 
specimens. If the process occurred at all, it was both 
too minute in its workings and too diffuse in its 
temporal span to appear before the eyes of any man. 
The mechanism, that is the explanation of the change 
of species, had to be imagined. But it had to be 
imagined within some conceptual framework, or (if one 
pays attention to the predominantly iconic modes of 
scientific thinking . . .), within a system of images 
which would endow it with existential      
plausibility. . . . (p. 140) 
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A second important alternative to verificationism is 
constructivism, a position most closely associated with    
T. S. Kuhn (1962). Constructivists argue that scientific 
observation is itself dependent on scientific theories, and 
that there is no reality independent of that viewed through 
a set of socially imposed, theoretical constructions. Such 
a reality, together with unobservables, is "real" to any 
individual conceiving it, but it is a reality that is not 
independent of those constructions, and given, for example, 
two sufficiently conflicting constructions -- said to be 
"incommensurable" -- there may in fact be no mutually 
accepted way of resolving which is correct. According to 
Kuhn, it just such a conflict between incommensurable 
constructions or "paradigms" that characterize key 
revolutions in basic scientific world-views. 
 
Similarly, Kuhn (1977, pp. 24 - 28) has argued that what 
counts as explanatory is rooted in prevalent scientific 
theories and, like those theories, has changed over time. 
In particular, he cites four phases (so far) in causal 
explanation: (a) the Aristotelian approach based on 
material, efficient, formal and final causes, an approach 
which gave way around the scientific renaissance of the 
17th century and came to be viewed as so much "word-play"; 
(b) a mechanical approach that arose with the success of 
celestial mechanics, in which all causation was eventually 
traced to some sort of "physical impact"; (c) a 
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mathematical approach which paralleled the increased 
mathematicization of physics, in which an equation from 
which effects could be derived substituted for mechanical 
causation and even eliminated, to an extent, the explicit 
use of the term "cause"; and (d) a 20th century notion of 
causation tempered by the probabilities and uncertainties 
of quantum mechanics, in which, in some cases, the very 
idea of a cause of an event is completely eschewed.  
 
To what extent each of these causal modes counted as 
satisfactory explanation also evolved over time, though was 
ultimately dependent on the associated theory: 
The pragmatic success of a scientific theory seems to 
guarantee the ultimate success of its associated 
explanatory mode. Explanatory force may, however, be a 
long time coming. The experience of many 
contemporaries with quantum mechanics and relativity 
suggests that one may believe a new theory with deep 
conviction and still lack the retraining and 
habituation to receive it as explanatory. That comes 
only with time, but to date it has always come (p. 29) 
 
A constructivist viewpoint can also be viewed as supportive 
of the idea of a psychological basis for a satisfactory 
explanation in perception/imagability in that reality 
itself is perceived only through the psychological 
constraints imposed by theoretical constructions. However, 
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the arbitrary and open-ended nature of these constructions, 
and the evolving nature of "explanatory force" are at odds 
with any attempt to fix a limit on what can be 
satisfactorily explained, and it appears that the 
possibility of as now unimaginable solutions to problems 
such as the origin of the universe is perhaps most 
explicitly embraced by a constructivist viewpoint. Of 
course, past evolution of what counts as explanatory is no 
guarantee of its unlimited future success. Further, any 
constructions would, as Fodor has suggested, still face 
certain limiting conditions imposed by the existence of 
some (any) cognitive architecture. Nevertheless, granting 
the social-conventional and changing nature of what counts 
as satisfactory explanation in the constructivist point of 
view would reduce one's faith in the ability to discern 
those limits. 
 
Moving to less formally philosophic and more psychological 
work, one finds that the idea of subjective or direct 
understanding shows up in Gestalt psychology (e.g., Kohler, 
1947) and in work in perception and theories of meaning 
(cf. Lakoff's concept of "experiential understanding in 
Lakoff, 1987). In addition, there is the specific view that 
mental images are not pictures subject to interpretation 
but, rather, directly represent (our understanding of) 
certain ideas. On this view, images are "embodiments of 
thoughts" (Reisberg and Chambers, 1986, p. 209), structured 
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if pictorial representations of concepts that by definition 
cannot be ambiguous or interpreted in multiple ways. Under 
such an interpretation, the link between imaging and 
conceptualizing is almost tautologous: the failure to 
produce an image is equivalent to rather than responsible 
for the failure to produce a corresponding concept; and 
claiming the origin of the universe cannot be conceived 
because no suitable image can be formed only begs the 
question, being equivalent to claiming no concept of it is 
possible. 
 
While such an interpretation of images, if true, would 
weaken the explanatory power of the hypothesis under 
consideration, it still leaves the impossibility of such 
images as evidence for the impossibility of the 
corresponding concepts (though there could be other 
reasons, presumably, for the absence of images). Such an 
interpretation also leaves intact the expectation that 
vivid imagers would view the absence of such images as 
evidence for the impossibility of the corresponding 
concepts, and so be more pessimistic than poor visualizers. 
 
 
Summary of related work 
 
The following is a summary of some of the important points 
demonstrated or suggested in the work just reviewed: 
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 1. Imagery is frequently used in problem solving, and 
facilitates learning and recall in many situations. 
Problem representation and solution of both novices and 
experts often seems to embrace a perception-based, 
recognition component.  
 2. Causality may be a hard-wired basic construct that 
is directly perceived. Imagery is often used to simulate 
processes or otherwise demonstrate causal relationships. 
 3. There is considerable variability in reported 
imagery vividness, with the likelihood that at least some 
people do not have visual images at all. Individual 
differences appear to vary systematically to at least some 
extent by vocation, though all levels of imagery usage and 
vividness can likely be found in any occupation and at any 
level of expertise. 
 4. Vivid visual imagery can interfere with 
performance, including verbal or abstract thinking, concept 
attainment and recall of certain information. 
 5. The effects of imagery are related not only to 
vividness but to instructions/readiness to use imagery, to 
imagery frequency and possibly to unfamiliarity. 
 6. Imagery appears to play some role in creativity, at 
least for many, especially in its ability to simultaneously 
represent many aspects of a situation.  
 7. Experts are more likely to use forward-based 
reasoning than novices, to have fuzzier, more complex 
encodings and to have developed abstractions not available 
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to novices; however, experts continue to also use simple 
concepts and examples, and even expert abstractions tend to 
be image-based. 
 8. Contemporary philosophy offers no consensus view of 
causation that would either support or contradict the 
thesis under consideration, but the scientific realism 
dominant among professional philosophers is consistent with 
the view that causal relationships require imagable 
entities. 
 9. Psychological structure may in fact limit concept 
attainment, and such limitations may be defined by the 
limits set by what is imagable/intuitive. Imagery may be 
necessary for widespread understanding of a phenomenon from 
a realistic perspective.  
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METHOD 
 
Subjects 
 
Eight physicists/astronomers were recruited from Boston-
area universities through advertisements placed on 
department bulletin boards. Subjects were chosen so as to 
represent a range of expertise, and included one 1st-year 
graduate student in astronomy, two 4th-year physics 
graduate students (both with M.S. degrees and additional 
study in physics), a working astronomer (with an M.S. in 
astronomy), one ABD physicist, two recent Ph.D's in 
astrophysics and an astrophysicist who received his Ph.D. 
in 1985. Several of the subjects specialized in cosmology. 
There were 6 male subjects and 2 female subjects. 
 
Three pilot subjects, all physics graduate students, were 
also seen. 
 
Procedure 
 
Sessions consisted of an initial interview focusing on 
basic questions and reasoning about the origin of the 
universe, collection of background and biographical 
information, administration of two visual imagery 
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instruments and, finally, some brief questions about the 
subject's use of imagery in their work. 
 
Each subject was interviewed/tested once for approximately 
one hour. All sessions were conducted over the telephone 
and tape-recorded. Answer sheets (without questions) for 
the imagery instruments were mailed to subjects in advance, 
and the tests were administered orally over the phone and 
answers read back to the experimenter at the end. 
 
Subjects were paid $ 50.  
 
Interview 
 
Following Simon's "think-aloud" approach for extracting 
protocol data (Ericsson & Simon, 1984) the general approach 
during the interview portion was to ask subjects to think 
aloud as they tried to answer questions about the origin of 
the universe (given the unstructured nature of the 
questions as compared to most problem-solving, no attempt 
was made to additionally collect the retrospective reports 
Simon recommends of how subjects recollect answering the 
problems). The questions themselves basically consisted of 
repeated attempts to force subjects to justify or explain 
the basis of each preceding answer or explanation.  
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The following instructions (a modified version of the 
instructions found in Ericsson & Simon, p. 378) were read 
to subjects at the start of the interview: 
In this first part of the study I am interested in 
what you think about when you try to answer certain 
questions about the origin of the universe. In order 
to do this I am going to ask you to think aloud as you 
try to answer these questions. What I mean by think 
aloud is that I want you tell me everything you are 
thinking from the time you first hear the question 
until you give me an answer. I would like you to talk 
aloud constantly from the time I present each question 
until you have given your answer to the question. I 
don't want you to try to plan out what you say or try 
to explain to me what you are saying. Just act as if 
you are alone in the room speaking to yourself. It is 
most important that you keep talking. If you are 
silent for any long period of time I will ask you to 
talk. Do you understand what I want you to do ? 
 
Good, now we will begin with some practice questions. 
First, I want you to tell me how many windows are in 
your house, and tell me what you are thinking as you 
get an answer.  
 
Good. Now I will give you a more abstract practice 
question that is more similar to the questions I will 
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be asking you in the study. Remember to tell me 
everything you are thinking from the time you hear the 
question until you're done with your answer. Here's 
the practice question: Do you think people basically 
have free will and can choose their own course of 
action, or do you think everything a person does is 
caused by some preceding physical state, making free 
will mostly an illusion ? 
 
Good. Now we'll move on to the study questions 
themselves. Remember to tell me everything you are 
thinking from the time you hear each question. 
 
Some or all of the following questions were then asked, 
with the exact course of the interview determined by the 
answers given: 
 1. How do you think the universe began ?  
 2. [In reply to a Big Bang explanation:] What came 
before the Big Bang ?  
 3. [In reply to some sort of Steady State or eternal/ 
cyclical universe explanation:] What is the original cause 
of that state (or cycle) ? 
 4. [In repeated reply to any earlier professed single 
point of creation or existing state:] What came before that 
(or what was the cause of that state) ? 
 5. [Assuming a response that we don't know the answer 
to that question of what came before or was the cause of 
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...:] Can you imagine our finding an explanation for this 
question ? Would such an explanation answer all the 
relevant questions of physics ? Can you give me an example 
of what might possibly be such an explanation ? Could any 
explanation or subsequent explanation answer all such 
questions of physics ? Would other questions -- 
philosophical or religious -- remain ? Could we reach a 
point where all of these questions would also be answered ?  
(For all of these a "why or why not" follow-up was asked as 
appropriate.) 
 6. [Assuming some direct response that the question is 
solved, either by physics or some professed religious or 
other belief:] Does that answer fully satisfy you or is 
there anything disagreeable or vaguely unexplained by it ? 
Why or why not ? You say you are satisfied with that 
answer, and that there is simply nothing more to be said -- 
why doesn't everyone feel the same way ? Would they if they 
understood enough physics/shared your 
religious/philosophical beliefs ? Is there perhaps more to 
know but we somehow can't know it ? Could some more 
advanced species than us possibly understand truths about 
this that we can't grasp ? 
 7. [Assuming some fairly abstract solution that is 
presented as an answer:] That answer sounds very abstract. 
Is that really the world or just a useful theory for 
generating answers to problems ? Is there a sense in which 
you know it is mathematically correct but it is still 
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somehow not real, not fully satisfying ? What's missing ? 
Why do you think that is ? Can you imagine a fully 
satisfying answer ? Why or why not ? What would one look 
like ? 
 8. [Assuming some response that the question is, or we 
have arrived at a point where the remaining question is 
meaningless:] Does that leave anything unsatisfied ? Why or 
why not ? Are people's attempts to find some answer to it 
just mistaken, a bad habit ? Have we reached a limit where 
we can't talk meaningfully about this subject any more but 
there may be more to talk about ? 
 9. It's been suggested that if the Big Bang is the 
beginning of space and time, it is meaningless to ask about 
a cause of it or something before it, since there is no 
time before it. Do you agree ? Why or why not ? If you 
agree, does that leave any idea or feeling about a need for 
explanation that is still not addressed ? 
 10. It's been suggested that the universe may have 
originated from a quantum fluctuation occurring in some 
preceding vacuum, and that a fully developed theory around 
this idea might present a complete and satisfying answer to 
how "something" came from nothing. What do you think of  
that ? 
 
Biographical and background information 
 
The following information was then collected from subjects: 
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 1. Degrees, subjects, dates 
 2. Area of expertise 
 3. Self-categorization as theoretical or experimental 
 4. Self-categorization of level of mathematical 
expertise for someone in this field (low, medium, high) 
 5. Religious beliefs; belief in God, divine creation, 
etc. 
 
Imagery measurements 
 
Subjects were then administered two visual imagery tests. 
The first of these measured imagery frequency using Cohen 
and Saslona's IDQ-IHS, the Individual Differences 
Questionnaire-Imagery Habit Scale (1990, and personal 
correspondence, October 28, 1991), minus the distracter 
questions regarding study habits, which would have made 
individual sessions too long. This scale was constructed by 
Cohen and Saslona by extracting those items from Paivio's 
original IDQ (1971) that subsequent testing showed loaded 
highly on a frequency of imagery factor (Paivio, 1983), and 
modified by Cohen and Saslona from true/false questions to 
a 5-point Likert scale to extract more information (as 
suggested by the revision to the IDQ of Hiscock, 1978). 
Cohen and Saslona report on unpublished work that shows 
that the IDQ-IHS has been shown to have good internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability (p. 103).  
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In addition, two imagery questions that Paivio's factor 
analysis (1983) showed to load highly on a "use of images 
to solve problems" factor (p. 477) were randomly inserted 
into the IDQ-IHS questions to provide some additional 
relevant data points. 
 
The IDQ-IHS instructions and questions used appear as 
Appendix A. The two additional problem-solving questions 
are questions 2 and 5. 
 
The second imagery test that was administered was Marks's 
VVIQ, the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (1973 
and personal correspondence, November, 1991). This test is 
the most popular measure of imagery vividness and an 
instrument shown to have relatively good test-retest and 
split-half reliability (Marks, 1973). 
 
The instructions and questions used for the VVIQ appear as 
Appendix B. 
 
Imagery usage discussion 
 
Finally, subjects were asked to describe in their own terms 
their use of imagery in their work and their view (if any) 
of its importance. 
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RESULTS 
 
The following describes the interviews, biographical 
background of subjects, imagery test measurements and 
imagery discussions, as well as some relationships among 
those different measurements. 
 
Interview results 
 
This section presents 3 views of the interviews conducted 
with each subject: (1) a tabular presentation of 
categorized subject responses, (2) some general summary 
impressions of the interviews, and (3) a more detailed 
description of each subject interview, including verbatim 
excerpts from each interview. 
 
Tabulated results 
 
Each independent relevant belief concerning the ultimate 
origin of the universe was extracted from the interview 
recordings and a tabulation made indicating which subjects 
expressed those beliefs or beliefs nearly identical to 
them. Any closely related beliefs were then grouped 
together into a general belief statement and new 
tabulations made as to how many subjects expressed one or 
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more of the component beliefs in that group. These groups 
of beliefs, together with those beliefs not placed into a 
group are shown below with the number and identities (s1, 
s2, etc.) of subjects expressing the belief or, in the case 
of a belief group, the number and identities expressing one 
or more component beliefs (in the latter case, the 
component beliefs are also shown, together with the 
subjects expressing each; the group total may not equal the 
totals of components since a given subject may have 
expressed more than one component belief): 
 
1. Belief: The problem of the origin of the universe cannot 
be answered and/or does not even make sense within current-
day physics or science. 
n = 8 (all subjects) 
Component beliefs: 
 a. This is outside the laws of physics. (n = 4: s2, 
s3,    s4, s5) 
b. You can't observe or experiment with what came 
   before the Big Bang, making it not an object for 
   scientific study (n = 4: s2, s3, s7, s8) 
c. It makes no sense to talk about it. (n = 3: s3, s7,  
   s8) 
d. I can't conceive of what came before the Big Bang.  
   (n = 2: s1, s6) 
e. It is not a scientific questions. (n = 1: s3) 
 f. This stuff is currently unvisualizeable, and I  
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    need a tangible image to be satisfied. (n = 1: s2) 
 
2. Belief: It is possible that this question could be 
answered sometime in the future or be re-formulated to be 
more sensible. 
n = 6: s1, s2, s4, s5, s7, s8 
Component beliefs: 
a. We may be able to answer the question in the 
future.  
   (n = 6: s1, s2, s4, s5, s7, s8) 
 
 b. We have solved seemingly unsolvable problems in the  
  
    past. (n = 2: s1, s4) 
c. Our intuition can evolve; what seems unsolvable or 
   unsatisfying now may not seem so later. (n = 1: s2) 
d. We may be able to decompose the question into  
   intelligible sub-questions in the future.  
   (n = 1: s7) 
 
3. Belief: We will never be able to re-phrase or solve this 
problem scientifically. 
n = 2: s3, s6 
No components. 
 
4. Belief: There is [however] a valid philosophical or 
religious question about the ultimate origin of the 
universe. 
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n = 7: s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7 
Component beliefs: 
 a. It borders on religion/is a valid religious  
        question. (n = 6: s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6) 
 b. It is a valid philosophical question.  
    (n = 3: s3, s6, s7) 
 c. Saying there is no problem because there can be  
    nothing before the beginning of space-time is  
    contrived, a cop-out. (n = 2: s2, s6) 
 d. Saying that a quantum fluctuation in a vacuum 
        completely solves the problem is not the end of 
        the story, is contrived. (n = 2: s2, s6) 
 e. God may have set things in motion. (n = 2: s4, s5) 
 f. It's a philosophical question but anything is;  
        philosophy has little credence. (n = 2: s3, s5) 
 g. It points to the current limits of language.  
    (n = 1: s7) 
 
5. Belief: This is simply a meaningless question; asking it 
is carrying human curiosity too far.  
n = 1: s8 
No component beliefs. 
 
6. Belief: There are limits to what we can know. 
n = 7: s1, s2, s3, s5, s6, s7, s8 
Component beliefs: 
 a. We may not be able to understand everything.  
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        (n = 3: s2, s6, s7) 
 b. There are always more questions. (n = 2: s1, s5) 
 c. Science has its limits. (n = 3: s3, s7, s8) 
 d. One gets caught in an infinite loop of questions. 
    (n = 1: s2) 
 e. There is always the question of ultimate origin. 
    (n = 1: s7)  
 
A note on the above tabulations: The questions posed aimed 
to elicit the subjects' thinking on these questions, and 
were not forced-choice. Nevertheless, if we look at 
expressed beliefs and their negations we can see that (a) 
all subjects expressed the belief that the problem cannot 
be solved today, and no subjects expressed the view that it 
could; (b) all subjects expressed either the belief that 
the question could someday be answered (belief 2, n = 6) or 
that it would never be scientifically answered (belief 3, n 
= 2), and no single subject maintained both beliefs (though 
subjects sometimes held related inconsistent beliefs, e.g., 
in the existence of certain limits, in which case both 
beliefs are reported above; or responded one way initially, 
often casually, but then expressed a different belief after 
repeated questioning, in which case the final expressed 
belief was generally used); and (c) all subjects expressed 
either the belief that there is nevertheless a valid 
philosophical or religious question (belief 4, n = 7) or 
that there is no such remaining question (belief 5, n = 1), 
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and no single subject expressed both. All subjects but one 
expressed the belief that there are limits on what we can 
know (belief 6), though the remaining subject, while not 
stating this, did not explicitly state that everything 
could someday be known. 
 
General interview results and impressions 
 
This section describes some of the general results and 
themes that were present in the interviews. 
 
1. In response to the first question about how the universe 
began, all subjects led off with the statement that the Big 
Bang was their current view of the origin of the universe, 
with many subjects going on at some length about it and 
offering significant detail. No subjects initially 
expressed the opinion that the (ultimate) origin of the 
universe was unknown or not today a valid scientific 
problem. Rather, all subjects immediately interpreted the 
question as a straightforward scientific problem whose 
current best answer was the Big Bang. 
 
2. When asked what came before the Big Bang, all subjects 
quickly offered some form of the belief that this was not a 
valid scientific question -- "it's not known," "that's the 
limit of current-day physics," etc. Some subjects qualified 
this by saying that that was the current situation, while 
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others simply and flatly said that the problem was outside 
of science (though typically retreated after later 
questioning to the more qualified view).  
 
Many subjects quickly offered that the question was more 
properly a part of or bordered on philosophical or 
religious questions, though only a few indicated they had 
seriously thought about it or considered the question 
significant, e.g., one subject said that, since it was not 
part of science, one's view of that question today was 
simply a matter of "taste." Other subjects clung at least 
for a while to the idea that this was simply a non-
scientific question, or that, scientifically speaking, 
there was nothing before the Big Bang, and that that was 
all there was to it.  
  
When asked if this view of the problem was satisfying, most 
subjects indicated that it was not completely so. However, 
interestingly, no subjects indicated this was a burning or 
particularly significant question for them. Rather, the 
lack of satisfaction expressed was usually tentative (at 
least or especially at this early stage of the interview), 
almost an afterthought, and sometimes explained away by the 
admission that science, after all, has its limits. 
 
For some subjects this problem of understanding what came 
before the Big Bang was related to the difficulty of 
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producing a testable hypothesis, or having anything to 
observe. Without observation or experimentation, these 
subjects felt there could be no science, and hence no 
scientific problem. These subjects had essentially a "black 
box" view of science: there were observations and laws 
derived from them that let you put numbers into equations 
and predict results. There was, in this model, little role 
for questions of meaning or ultimate significance, even if 
these same subjects accepted that such questions might have 
some validity outside of science. While some subjects did 
not mention the importance of observation or espouse this 
black box view of science, no subjects contradicted it. 
 
A few subjects immediately saw and raised the conceptual 
problem of identifying a fundamental cause, raising 
concerns of "infinite loops" and endless questions about 
what came before.  
 
3. When pressed about whether there was nevertheless a 
valid philosophical or religious question, almost all 
subjects (n = 7) expressed the view that there was, even if 
it was not today within science. However, it often took 
repeated questioning for subjects to leave the scientific 
perspective  and consider the problem seriously from a 
philosophical or religious perspective, sometimes even if 
they had originally stated in an offhand manner than the 
question was more philosophic than scientific. Two subjects 
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placed very low value on this (e.g., s3: "You can never 
prove anything in philosophy or ... religion.... Religion 
and philosophy can basically say anything.") but most 
seemed (at least eventually) to attribute some weight or 
force to the philosophic/religious puzzle that remained, 
though the amount varied from subject to subject.  
 
The one subject who has been tabulated as not expressing 
the belief that a valid philosophical or religious question 
existed was not completely unequivocal about this. However,  
such equivocation as there was came mostly in response to 
fairly repeated pushing, and did not seem to be the 
subject's true view. Also, the amount of support for 
viewing this as a valid question was, even then, 
qualitatively less than from any other subject.  
 
No subject suggested there was a clear philosophic or 
religious answer today to these questions. The two subjects 
who mentioned God as a possible solution did not offer this 
as a definitive explanation but rather as a possible 
explanation for whatever philosophic/religious question 
might remain after future scientific successes. 
 
4. The question about whether there might someday be a 
solution to this problem evoked some confusion or conflict 
in all subjects except s8 (the one subject who fairly 
consistently denied the existence of a substantive 
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problem). This often recalled conflicts over the earlier 
question of what came before the Big Bang, and took the 
form of subjects being more tentative (including those who 
had been very confident up to that point), sometimes 
changing their mind, or actually holding what appeared to 
be inconsistent beliefs. Here's a quick run-down of the 
kind of conflict that was observed, by subject: 
 
Subject 1: Couldn't conceive of an answer but 
explicitly thought that that collided with intuition, 
that maybe there could be an answer if we saw the 
world a different way. 
 
Subject 2: Had faith and a positive desire that there 
could be an answer, as there has been for other 
problems, but kept running into the unique limitations 
of this problem (e.g., what set these laws in motion); 
still, said his mind resisted copping out. 
 
Subject 3: Very dismissive of the problem initially: 
sounded relatively satisfied, the idea of a quantum 
fluctuation seemed like a possibility, saw a 
philosophical problem but a fairly trivial one. But 
then, after 20 minutes, slowed and got more tentative, 
and said the solutions discussed only seemed to push 
the problem further back. 
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Subject 4: Saw the problems as practical, thought it 
might be solved in a billion years; then said the 
question of who put it there would remain; and then 
later said that maybe there could be a solution after 
all. 
 
Subject 5: Thought it possible to solve, but, after 
probing, started to ramble and become somewhat 
confused about the problem being discussed. 
 
Subject 6: Thought maybe 'nothing' was the whole 
answer, but then, on reflection, thought that couldn't 
be it, that 'nothing' was a cop-out; then thought 
maybe she wasn't the right person to answer the 
question. 
 
Subject 7: Thought the question well-posed 
philosophically, that progress was possible; after 15 
minutes, however, thought the question could never be 
answered, but then, finally, thought that maybe it 
just barely could, that the limitations were just 
those of today. 
 
Abstracting from the above, we can see two general classes 
of responses: (1) subjects who fairly directly perceived an 
unresolved conflict between current scientific doctrine 
(which they generally accepted, and which rules the problem 
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out of bounds) and their intuitions or desires about the 
extent and solvability of this problem; and (2) subjects 
who generally started responding within a relatively narrow 
scientific perspective (that was, given current doctrine, 
largely indifferent to or dismissive of the problem, or 
perhaps hopeful of an eventual solution) but then, usually 
after 15 or 20 minutes, became more tentative and open to 
the difficulties of the problem, almost as if their 
habitual scientific manner had been worn down and they were 
seeing the difficulties of the problem for the first time, 
or perhaps facing it anew without the defense of their 
training and work.  
 
In both cases the conflict was apparently sufficiently 
unresolved to have many subjects embrace one position and 
then another, only to perhaps return back to an earlier 
one, while other subjects became obviously confused, or 
engaged in some form of self-doubt about their ability to 
competently answer the question. 
 
Ultimately, most subjects (n = 6) expressed and seemed to 
maintain (however slightly) the belief that, despite their 
current scientific assessment of the question as 
meaningless or unsolvable, it might indeed be answered in 
the future. None of these subjects had any particular 
expectation of what such a solution might look like (though 
some referred to Stephen Hawking's theories), or even much 
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confidence that this would be the case (there was some 
variation here, with one or two subjects willing to throw 
out time periods -- "a hundred years" -- after which there 
might be some more insight, but all subjects were 
essentially non-specific about future success). Rather, 
there was simply the belief that it could happen, 
substantiated primarily by the fact that "anything is 
possible," or that difficult problems had been solved 
before (a few subjects explicitly mentioned other difficult 
problems that had been solved despite seeming very hard at 
the time). This belief in a possible future solution was 
expressed (inconsistently ?) even by the one subject who 
saw not only no valid scientific question today but not 
even a meaningful philosophic or religious question, though 
such a possibility of an eventual solution (to an eventual 
problem) was considered to be little more than a 
possibility.  
 
Such beliefs in at least the technical possibility of a 
solution to this problem were all the more remarkable in 
light of the fact that most subjects expressed some view 
that science had its limits, or that there were questions 
that could not be solved; and, obviously, these sentiments 
arose in response to discussion about understanding the 
origin of the universe. It appears, however, that, although 
subjects believed in the limitations of science, the power 
of past scientific success was too great for them to label 
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this (or perhaps any particular) problem as unsolvable; 
science may have its limits, but we cannot, as it were, 
know what it is those limits prevent us from doing. 
 
The limitations of science were, in fact, frequently seen 
as a good thing, with several subjects mentioning that they 
hoped all questions could not be answered, since that would 
be the "end of science," a distinctly uninteresting and 
unappealing state of affairs for them. (Again, the 
impossibility of knowing which questions are unsolvable 
seems implicitly important here; if one know certain 
questions to be unsolvable, they would not be very good 
subjects of investigation, and would hardly help keep the 
scientific endeavor going). 
 
5. Most subjects seemed unfamiliar with or uncomfortable 
focusing on what they saw as the essentially non-scientific 
(at least today) question of the origin of the universe. 
Many subjects kept drifting back to related but narrower 
and more directly scientific questions, or otherwise had 
trouble staying focused on the questions at hand. Some 
subjects openly expressed or conveyed by their tone or 
speech their disdain for what they might be forced to admit 
were valid philosophical or religious questions.  
 
6. There was some use of visual language during the 
interviews ("picture," "can't see anything there," etc.), 
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but as the tabulated results show only one subject 
volunteered the statement that visualization was directly 
connected to problem difficulty. (More information on the 
role of visualization came out when subjects were directly 
asked about their use of imagery during the imagery usage 
discussion at the very end of the session; these results 
are reported below.) 
 
 
 
Psychological processes in interview responses 
 
A principal hypothesis of this study was that a 
psychological individual difference factor -- visual 
imagery frequency and/or vividness -- would be related to 
subject perception of the unsolvability of the problem of 
the origin of the universe because of an underlying 
connection between adequate physical explanation and 
imagability. One subject did specifically mention the need 
for, and difficulty (if not impossibility) in this case, of 
an adequate visualization for satisfactorily solving this 
problem, and a few subjects made at least some use of 
visual language. However, there was no clear or general 
relationship observed in the interview portion of the study 
between difficulties in imaging a possible solution and 
perceived problem unsolvability. 
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However, the hesitation, inconsistency or outright reversal 
of opinions (or combinations of these) described in the 
previous section and that was seen to some degree in nearly 
all subjects suggests the presence of some significant 
psychological process(es) beyond a simple problem solving 
effort motivated by the study setting, even if this process 
is not obviously connected to subjects' use or vividness of 
visual imagery in thinking about this problem. What, we may 
ask, is going on psychologically as subjects struggle with 
such obvious difficulty or lack of consistency to voice 
their opinions on the questions asked ? We can make the 
following observations: 
 
1. Most subjects approached what initially appeared to be 
directly scientific questions (e.g., How do you think the 
universe began ?) at least initially and often for some 
time with the scientific style and assumptions one would 
think appropriate for such questions and which we would in 
any case expect to be habitual as a result of their 
scientific training and/or professional work, possibly 
further motivated by the knowledge that they were solicited 
for this study specifically because of that scientific 
training, e.g., when asked how the universe began, several 
subjects launched into fairly lengthy and detailed 
explanations of the Big Bang and the events immediately 
following it. However, the questions posed are better 
described as, and sooner or later came to be seen more 
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accurately as meta-scientific (e.g., Is a solution to this 
problem possible ? Is such a possible solution completely 
satisfying ? etc.) This shift in the nature of the 
questions being asked and the need to draw on information 
or opinions outside of their scientific training per se 
might by itself reasonably be expected to produce some 
hesitation and uncertainty in subjects as they re-oriented 
their thinking over the course of the interviews. 
 
2. The repeated questions about what came before the Big 
Bang revealed a further and less easily resolved conflict 
in that, for all subjects but one (s8) there was, sooner or 
later, a perceived inconsistency between scientific 
doctrine -- which subjects indeed believed made the 
question of what came before the Big Bang meaningless or 
unanswerable (or at least non-scientific) -- and their 
meta-scientific (or directly philosophic) beliefs or 
intuitions that a meaningful question remained. The belief 
in scientific doctrine was typically dominant (as might be 
expected through sheer force of habit as well as conscious 
belief and motivation) and often made more difficult the 
eliciting of the meta-scientific beliefs and intuitions, 
which in some cases had apparently not been given much 
consideration before; in other cases, though, the subject 
was aware of and explicitly stated the conflict, e.g., 
subject 2 slowed when asked what came before the Big Bang, 
said that that couldn't be determined and that there was 
117 
"no justification in logic" for an answer but said that he 
had "faith" that the "artificial boundary" could be broken, 
adding that he has the "intuition that time exists outside 
this universe," but that that intuition "may be false." 
 
The reasoning behind the hypothesized connection between 
imagery frequency/vividness and belief in unsolvability 
would also seem to apply to the relationship between visual 
imagery and the extent to which subjects believed there to 
be a valid (unsolved) problem there at all: given a basis 
for physical explanation in imagable constructs, frequent 
or more vivid imagers would presumably be more sensitive to 
the lack of adequate image-based explanation contained 
within the mathematics of the Big Bang (as well as more 
pessimistic about eventual solvability because of the 
difficulty of finding any other image-based solution). 
Viewed another way, a measure of one's view of the problem 
as unsolvable is obviously influenced by the extent to 
which one considers the problem substantive (or already 
solved!). As a result, given the somewhat unexpected 
unanimous belief that science indeed says there is nothing 
before the Big Bang, and, in that sense, declares the 
problem solved (or a non-problem) and the variation in the 
extent to which individuals nevertheless perceive there to 
be a valid (unsolved) problem we can use that variation as 
a further component of a more broadly conceived 
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"unsolvability" measure in the correlational studies with 
the visual imagery measures presented below. 
 
3. The repeated questions about whether a complete solution 
would ever be possible provoked for nearly all subjects a 
second conflict between two inconsistent, but, in this 
case, both meta-scientific beliefs: that a complete 
solution to this problem was not possible, and that, on the 
other hand, one could not say that any specific problem was 
beyond the reach of science. The latter belief was, as 
might be expected, more accessible and dominant, if 
somewhat superficially maintained. For example, subject 4 
said the question could never be answered completely, but 
then added, somewhat emptily, that maybe there'd be enough 
physics to tackle the question in "a million years"; 
subject 2 said that physics teaches the importance of 
analogy, and since similar hard problems had been solved, 
it might happen here -- but he couldn't really see how. 
 
4. In general there was considerable macro-level uniformity 
in the meta-scientific views expressed about problem 
existence/unsolvability (despite the measurable variations 
in the strength of these views), suggesting a possible 
common factor underlying them. Although their was no 
obvious role that visual imagery played in the interviews, 
it is worth pointing out that this does not rule out visual 
imagery as being that factor, since the hypothesis in 
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question does not require any explicit mention or use of 
imagery in reasoning about this problem, but only 
differential sensitivity to unsolvability based on 
underlying imagery competencies. Further, a very strong 
relationship between visual imagery and problem 
unsolvability might actually suggest that basic visual 
imagery competencies would be sufficient to produce fairly 
uniform views on problem existence/unsolvability (as were 
found here), providing good confirmation of that 
relationship only in the differences revealed in rank order 
correlations or in extreme or infrequent cases. 
 
Interview details 
 
Below are detailed descriptions of each of the interviews, 
including information about the tone and general state of 
mind of each subject on these questions. Selected literal 
excerpts are presented as well. Subjects are presented in 
numerical order. The first 7 subjects thought the question 
of what ultimately came before the Big Bang non-scientific 
(as all 8 subjects did) but still valid or well-posed in 
some sense. Subject 8 is the lone subject who did not 
consider the question meaningful in any way (at least 
today).  
 
Each subject is identified by subject number, followed by a 
brief description of the subject's experience level, self-
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categorization as experimental or theoretical (many 
volunteered "observational" as a third option, since this 
better characterizes the work of most observation-based 
astronomers, who cannot really be said to "experiment" with 
their objects of study), self-categorization as to relative 
mathematical expertise (low, medium, high) and gender. 
 
Subject 1 (4th-year graduate student, experimental, medium 
math, female): 
 
When asked what came before the Big Bang, this subject 
expressed the view that that could not be imagined or 
really conceived of, while at the same time feeling that 
that was a limitation of tools or science, and not an 
absolute limitation on what was true, or could be known. 
Unlike most subjects, the subject then immediately started 
to struggle in a groping and tentative way with what she 
saw as a clash between science (or mathematics) and 
intuition, and voluntarily suggested that religious or 
philosophical questions remained: 
I can't conceive of anything that came before it.... I 
can imagine finding an answer to things that I find 
inconceivable ... but, well, I don't know if imagine 
is the right word.... I can't really imagine it... 
There's always religious questions.... I don't have 
the tools to imagine it but if there was some way of 
understanding the world in a way different than the 
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way we see it then maybe there'd be a way of 
understanding what came before the Big Bang.  
 
The subject expressed this sense of scientific limits 
consistently throughout the interview. When asked about 
whether an answer would be possible in the future, she 
fairly quickly gave the response that it was a possibility 
but only that, saying "maybe God could explain it." When 
then asked as to whether that would indeed answer all 
questions, she indicated how slight she viewed that chance 
by quickly stating that she thought that you could probably 
never get a final answer to this question, that there would 
always be more questions: 
If we understood what was here before our universe we 
would then have more questions about whatever that 
was.... There'd always be more questions.  
 
Subject 2 (4th-year graduate student, experimental, medium 
math, male): 
 
This subject was very confident, and began with the 
statement that, having taken lots of relevant courses, the 
(first) question of how the universe began did not throw 
him. He went into some detail, including the statement that 
he "immediately think[s] of a small point." 
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When asked what came before the Big Bang, he slowed down 
considerably and said that that couldn't be done, that the 
laws we have now don't work for that problem, that we "must 
speculate," and that "confusion reigns." He also quickly 
volunteered that some people would invoke God at this 
point, but that that wouldn't end the questioning:  
I feel like that's the sort of question which in some 
ways isn't possible to model.... One tries to invoke 
things like God, what came before Him and you sort of 
get caught in this logical, infinite loop trying to 
figure out what happens before a given event. 
 
Despite the above, the subject was hopeful, saying that, 
though there was "no justification in logic," he had, as 
part of his "belief structure," a "faith" that we could 
"break this artificial boundary." This hope, however, kept 
running into what seemed to be the limits on this 
particular problem. For example, the subject pointed to 
mathematics, saying that, as it can describe an intuitive 
picture, so it can also describe an unintuitive picture, 
leaving open the possibility that intuition could then 
evolve to follow where the theories had led. He said this 
happened for him in quantum mechanics, that he went from no 
intuitions about it to some sort of intuitive 
understanding. However, when asked to (in effect) confirm 
that he was saying it would or at least could also happen 
in cosmology, there was a long pause, after which he said 
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that physics teaches the importance of analogy, and that 
since this has happened in the past, he must admit it could 
happen here; but he couldn't really see how. 
 
Part of the reason for this appeared to be the apparent 
impossibility of ever being able to test an ultimate 
cosmological hypothesis in a way comparable to the 
experimental confirmation of quantum mechanics. He 
emphasized that a fully satisfactory answer must be 
associated with "testable" results, something mentioned by 
a number of subjects. 
 
Nevertheless, the subject repeatedly affirmed at least the 
meaningfulness of the problem. When asked if some theory 
based on quantum fluctuation in a vacuum preceding the Big 
Bang might be a complete explanation, he allowed the 
possibility of such a theory though added "but what set 
these laws in motion ?" Similarly, when asked whether the 
Big Bang, as the beginning of time itself, in fact made the 
question of an earlier event meaningless, he indicated that 
that was true but that the question was meaningless only 
because there was "no context." The question, he said, is 
nevertheless "well-posed," and "[his] mind resists copping 
out." The tension with a science that today cannot address 
the problem and suggests the problem may not even be 
meaningful remains close at hand, however; the subject 
stated that "I have the intuition that time exists outside 
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this universe, but that may be false" (though his suspicion 
of the falsity of that particular intuition does not seem 
to extend more generally to the suspicion that there is no 
valid problem there at all to solve about the origin of the 
universe). At this point the subject, in halting speech, 
volunteered (as if to further explain his uncertainty and 
clash between science and intuition) that he accepts the 
idea that he might "not [be] capable of understanding 
everything," adding that the ideas of Godel (who proved the 
incompleteness of ordinary arithmetic) came to mind.  
 
The subject also volunteered that, in any case, a purely 
mathematical solution would not be good enough. He said 
that, while he has friends for whom "equations are enough," 
he required some visualization of the underlying concepts: 
"just the equations don't do it for me." This was the one 
subject who volunteered during the interviews that 
visualization was necessary for conceptual understanding. 
 
 
Subject 3 (Ph.D., 1985, observational, high math, male): 
 
Subject 3 was one of those who initially stayed fairly 
strictly within the confines of science, nodding towards a 
possible philosophical question but initially giving it 
very little weight, and only much later backing off of the 
scientific perspective and giving the difficulty of the 
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problem greater due. Even then, however, the subject stayed 
fairly much within the scientific perspective, making this 
subject the least accepting of the significance of this 
philosophical question of those 7 (of the 8) subjects who 
at least admitted the existence of such a question.  
 
When asked at the start what came before the Big Bang, this 
subject stated more than once that it didn't make much 
sense to talk about what came before the Big Bang:  
That's outside of science.... It's a philosophical or 
religious question.... I think strictly speaking that 
scientists would say there was nothing before the 
beginning ... and that's it.... As a human being ... 
you still think about it.... I don't think there are 
really limits on a philosophical question.... I think 
in science you do have limits. 
 
 
This subject then expressed the importance of observation 
and testing for anything scientific, stating that "you have 
to be able to experiment," and that this gave "only 
science" the ability to be definitive, adding that you can 
never prove anything in philosophy, that science was just a 
"black box" into which you put in numbers and got answers 
(implying deeper understanding was not the point), etc. The 
subject offered that (lay) people don't have a problem with 
the universe being finite in extent (which is fairly 
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dubious) but only with there being no "before," but that 
the latter was as much a fact as the former. 
 
When asked if he was personally satisfied with this, the 
subject repeated that one couldn't help thinking about it, 
but actually sounded quite satisfied that, despite such 
random thoughts, the matter was closed. He offered at this 
point that there was "enough to investigate in the first 
second... an infinite amount... enough to keep [him] ... 
happy," suggesting by his tone that investigation into what 
came before the Big did not much tempt him, and was perhaps 
wasteful given all the tractable problems one could 
address. 
 
The subject was then asked what he thought about the theory 
that the Big Bang might have arisen from a quantum 
fluctuation in a preceding vacuum. The subject said that 
was a possibility, and connected it to some other theories 
(about "baby universes") he had mentioned, elaborating with 
additional technical detail. The subject was then asked 
whether a fully developed quantum cosmology, should that be 
produced, might in fact solve the problem completely and 
fully, answering any imaginable questions about the origin 
of the universe. At this point, about 20 minutes into the 
interview, the subject rather doubtfully said "yeah, I 
don't know," and then laughed, stating that that would only 
push the problem further back. When then asked again if 
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this was (now) a problem outside of science, the subject 
for the first time hesitated and said he didn't know, 
though he continued to phrase the problem in scientific 
terms (e.g., in terms of a finite or infinite universe, 
"baby" universes breaking off from larger ones, etc.). When 
asked if he was therefore saying a complete answer was at 
least possible, he responded unequivocally that he hoped 
not (and presumably thought not), that "there'd be nothing 
left to do." When pressed, he said it was a philosophical 
question, but with little of the offhand dismissal that 
this judgment produced at the beginning of the interview.  
 
It was clear, though, that the subject did not move 
naturally towards or enjoy this philosophical view of the 
problem, preferring to stay immersed in what science had to 
say and could profitably study about the problem, and still 
treating the non-scientific aspects of the problem 
disdainfully (because they could not be definitively 
solved), if not as dismissively as before.  
 
The subject finally offered that we'd never understand 
everything, a position that only this and one other subject 
consistently maintained. However, even after making this 
admission, the subject again showed his embrace of the 
scientific endeavor and, in a sense, his disdain (vs. the 
real perplexity or awe shown by some other subjects) for 
this hard limit by stating again that it would be "very 
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boring" if we ever did, negating the import of the limit by 
implying that he'd just as soon have it and be assured of 
problems to tackle.   
 
 
 
Subject 4 (recent Ph.D., theoretical, medium math, male): 
 
When asked what came before the Big Bang, this subject said 
that "that's an interesting question," that, 
mathematically, "there doesn't have to be an answer" and 
that science starts to break down at that point. He fairly 
quickly raised the possibility of a cycle of creation and 
destruction, but as quickly observed that that doesn't 
really answer the question, adding that philosophy and 
religion come into play and that, for now, it was a matter 
of "taste." Throughout this opening set of statements the 
subject was calm and matter of fact, and while pushing the 
question out of physics and into philosophy or religion, 
there was no particular sense that the question was 
permanently unsolvable: 
The question would be valid to ask ... where it 
started ... like what put this whole thing in motion. 
I think it starts to border on the religion question. 
You run into problems with present-day physics. 
 
The subject was then asked whether there could ever be a 
possible solution to this problem in science even though it 
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was today not a question that science could address. His 
initial response focused, as did that of several other 
subjects, on the need of science to perform observable 
experiments, stating that it was a "tough question" because 
you would need such very high energies to, in effect, 
perform experiments comparable to what happened at the 
origin of the universe, and it was unclear that, as a 
practical matter, such energy requirements could be met (in 
fact, the subject then said they could not, and that the 
universe was unique in that respect). There was little 
concern, though, for any inherent conceptual problem. The 
subject did say that there was a problem with quantum 
mechanics breaking down at the point of the origin of the 
universe, but he nevertheless felt that the problem was, 
"in principle," solvable some day if somehow the question 
of energy requirements could be met or sidestepped. 
 
The subject was then reminded about his earlier statement 
that this was a matter of taste and asked if he was indeed 
saying that the problem could at some point not be a matter 
of taste but be solved. He answered that he did, that in 
one or two billion years, we would know whether the 
universe would expand forever or contract, etc. and the 
question could be answered. 
 
The subject was then reminded of the point that there 
seemed to be an ultimate question of what or who put things 
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in motion, and was asked whether that too could be 
answered. The subject first replied that, while it started 
to "border on the religious question" that, yes, there 
might be some framework for answering the question in the 
future. However, for the first time (some 15 minutes into 
the interview), the subject then said that that still 
wouldn't answer the question of "who put it there," and 
that that question could never be answered:  
That question will never be answered completely 
because obviously if you ... have nothing then 
presumably you won't get a lot of something. 
Inconsistently, however, the subject then turned around and 
offered that, maybe in "a million years" there might be 
enough physics to tackle this problem. 
 
The above shows the difficulty this and some other subjects 
had both in keeping focused on the question of an ultimate 
and complete explanation, rather than even slightly (but 
decisively) more tractable physical questions, and on 
deciding whether that question was in fact permanently 
unsolvable. In part this seemed for this subject (and 
others) to reflect a genuine uneasiness over whether there 
really were such unknowable questions (as reflected by the 
professions of possible solutions in the future, even if 
these couldn't be imagined), while at other times it seems 
more to reflect the subjects' natural predilection to focus 
on more tractable, less-than-ultimate problems and not 
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concede anything as permanently unsolvable (as evidenced by 
the eventual admission by most subjects of an inherent 
limitation on what could be known even as they continued to 
drift back to questions that perhaps could be answered or 
espouse the possibility of future solutions to the problem 
at hand). 
 
It may also be that some of the ambivalence shown by this 
subject was due to heretofore unarticulated religious 
beliefs, since, when next asked about the possibility of a 
complete explanation based on a quantum fluctuation in a 
vacuum, the subject replied that, if things were set up 
like that, then "God set it up" and just put things in 
motion, not worrying about any of the resulting details. 
When pressed as to whether God was a necessary part of the 
explanation for the origin of the universe, however, the 
subject replied that He was but (only) at present, which is 
consistent with his view that the question might someday be 
addressed by physics (though, again, he also expressed the 
thought that it could never be addressed). 
 
 
Subject 5 (recent Ph.D., theoretical, medium math, male): 
 
This subject had the most explicit religious beliefs of any 
subject (and also had the most rambling and difficult to 
comprehend musings about relevant or possible scientific 
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theories, not because of the difficulty of them per se as 
much as a lack of coherence; this may be due in part to 
this subject taking much more seriously than others the 
instructions to think aloud). In response to the first 
question of what came before the Big Bang, the subject said 
that there was no answer within science, that, as a 
Christian, he would say that the arbitrary starting point 
may have been caused by God, but that anything before that 
was just not in the realm of science. When asked if an 
answer could ever be found, he initially said no, repeating 
that it was not a scientific question; but then, after a 
pause, said that there was perhaps one possibility: 
That's not within the realm of science.... There's a 
certain arbitrariness which is not within the realm of 
science. I don't think there could ever be a 
scientific answer to that.... There is one possibility 
... not within the near future.... I do not believe it 
will be within our grasp even within a few hundred 
years....  
 
This "one possibility" was never fully explained, but 
related to the abstract possibility of an equation with no 
"free variables," i.e., one in which all values were fixed. 
The subject went on at length about the possibilities pro 
and con for such a scientific or mathematical solution 
before finally ending up (as the above quotation shows) on 
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the side of thinking it was not possible, though this did 
not seem to be a very firm conclusion. 
 
At this point the subject offered that: 
I think every religion has an answer.... I would say 
... philosophy is totally ... doesn't have any 
credence at all.... Whatever philosophy would say 
there's nothing to back it up.   
 
The subject added that any scientific answer would be too 
complex to accept (which is slightly different than his 
earlier statement that none would be possible). It then 
became clear that the subjects' musings had become focused 
more on the possibility of some all-encompassing theory of 
physics (referred to in physics as a "TOE" or "theory of 
everything") rather than the potentially narrower problem 
of the origin of the universe. When this was pointed out to 
the subject and he was asked to focus on the possibility of 
a solution to the narrower problem of origination, he 
responded that, yes, that was a "much simpler" problem and 
one that it was possible to someday solve.  
 
When then pressed about whether such a solution would 
really end the cycle of potentially endless questions, he 
slowed and started rambling again about very abstract 
technical problems, without seeming to ever come to an 
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answer. He mentioned Hawking's theories and said that they 
were "very weird." 
 
The question was then re-posed to him as why there was 
something rather than nothing. His response to this was 
that it was "almost philosophical," and that there would, 
indeed, 
never be a scientific answer to that (though he earlier 
said there was such a possibility, and he presumably 
retained certain religious beliefs that were relevant to 
the question). 
 
Subject 6 (M.S., astronomer, observational, medium math, 
female): 
 
This subject was fairly low-key, and was one of those to 
quickly embrace the difficulty of the question of the 
origin of the universe, admitting that she had considered 
the problem. She also was one who quickly saw a valid 
philosophical problem, though, like most other subjects, 
she vacillated some on the prospect of a scientific answer. 
She also had more critical views of the practice of science 
that the other subjects (perhaps because of her status as a 
working staff practitioner rather than a more academically 
oriented Ph.D.). Here are her initial comments about the 
question of what came before the Big Bang: 
135 
It's certainly something I think about and talk about 
with other scientists.... It's very much a 
philosophical question.... I think it's an area where 
... most of us don't really want to tread because ... 
it borders on the religious.... 
 
The subject then added that maybe the answer was that there 
was simply nothing before the Big Bang. However, after a 
short pause the subject then said that, no, she guessed she 
didn't think we'd ever find an answer, indicating that some 
questions have no answers and are just "too big to think 
about." When then asked if she thought there was a valid 
philosophical question there, she quickly asserted 
"absolutely" (this apparently being the resolution of her 
tension that there was a question to answer but, after 
reflection, no scientific answer forthcoming), adding that 
that was where a solution might come from. She then added 
that "I don't think that the answer will necessarily come 
from science," but qualified that with the statement that, 
if there were such an answer, it wouldn't be in the next 
100 years. 
 
The subject was then asked to clarify whether she thought 
there could ever be a scientific answer to this question. 
After a long pause, she said that, sometimes in science a 
difficult question is explained away by an exotic answer, 
perhaps so the answer would not be challenged. She said she 
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could perhaps give such an answer but she would be 
"bullshitting." She herself thought that for questions like 
this the simplest answers are often correct, and, after 
some reflection, said she guessed she couldn't really 
conceive of one, making her one of just two subjects who 
did not seriously maintain that a scientific solution was 
at least possible (though the vacillation is clear). 
 
She was then reminded of her earlier response that perhaps 
the answer was that there was nothing before the Big Bang 
(which she had also earlier moved away from, but now 
sounded still equivocal about), and asked to clarify 
whether or not that could be the answer. After a pause, she 
said she thought that such an answer would be a "cop-out," 
but was clearly still somewhat equivocal, adding that, 
though this was her view, she felt she was "dancing around" 
the answer, and that the questions were perhaps better 
posed to particle physicists than to astronomers like 
herself. 
 
This subject shows clearly the tension some subjects felt 
between official doctrine (which states, for the most part, 
that there is nothing before the Big Bang, not even time) 
and the problems or intuitions that subjects  
felt still remained (though they could conceive of no 
solution for them), though it often required persistent 
questioning and/or some visible effort to admit that 
137 
(effort which, for this subject, was accompanied by some 
amount of hostility to the official doctrine and/or 
perceived official practices). The subject was also quite 
open about something observed in but not directly expressed 
by other subjects: that physicists or astronomers would 
just as soon stay from these problems precisely because 
they seem to be outside of science and border on 
philosophical or religious questions.  
 
Subject 7 (ABD, theoretical, high math, male): 
 
This subject stayed fairly faithful to the idea that what 
came before the Big Bang could not be meaningfully talked 
about today, that there was a problem with, specifically, 
the language of such questions, but that he found this less 
than completely satisfying: 
I guess I don't think that question makes sense since 
I don't know how to define time before the Big Bang, 
because I think that the Big Bang was essentially the 
origin of what we call time.... I wouldn't say 
[that's] completely satisfactory.... Right now it's 
very difficult to frame a ... well-posed question that 
might be answered. 
 
When asked whether there was a valid philosophical question 
there, the subject replied that he thought discovering the 
existence of life on other planets would have philosophical 
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implications. This was not, of course, the question that 
was being asked (and perhaps reflects the lack of 
familiarity  or focus of this and other subjects with the 
question at hand). When the question was then repeated and 
clarified to pertain to the question of what came before 
the Big Bang, the subject agreed that this was a valid 
philosophical question, and tied it to the problem of how 
to talk about what came before the Big Bang: 
I think it's well-posed philosophically... in the 
sense it's putting the finger on precisely where our 
language breaks down. 
The subject added that he hadn't really considered this 
question much before (confirming the above observation 
about the subject's familiarity with the problem) though he 
had considered the problem (apparently related in his mind) 
of why we live in the number of dimensions that we do (this 
can perhaps be viewed as a somewhat similar but less 
"ultimate" question about why things are the way they are). 
 
When asked what he thought about there being no time before 
the Big Bang (which he had himself raised before) and hence 
no possibility of a cause, he concurred, repeated that the 
questions were simply meaningless, but again qualifying 
that by saying that that was how it was today, the way we 
currently understand those things. When asked if there 
could ever be a context in which these questions could be 
answered, he replied that the questions would not be so 
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much answered as replaced by other better-posed questions. 
He then said he hoped we would never get to a final answer, 
because that would be the "end of science," a theme echoed 
by other subjects.  
 
At this point, after some further questioning and some 15 
minutes into the interview, he offered that we would not, 
in fact, ever be able to fully answer that question: 
 I think there'll always be a question ... of what is 
the ultimate origin ... of the universe. I don't see 
any evidence that we will ever be able to give a 
complete answer of [sic] that question ... but we 
might be able to ... continue to push that back 
further.... I think science has its limitations. 
 
These limitations stemmed from the need to be able to 
experiment (also a commonly expressed viewpoint), however, 
rather than (implicitly) from more directly conceptual 
grounds. Nevertheless, this admission was, if not directly 
inconsistent with his earlier view that there was (only) a 
problem in the language of these questions given today's 
scientific context, a clear change in emphasis from the 
more circumstantial nature of the problems as he had 
earlier presented them, suggesting that such absolute 
limits were not prominent in his thinking. 
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Subject 8 (1st-year graduate student, theoretical, high 
math): 
 
This subject was the only subject to generally deny the 
presence of not only a well-posed scientific problem (at 
least today) but of any philosophical or religious problem 
as well. At the same time, this subject displayed some of 
the equivocation or inconsistency found among several of 
the subjects. 
 
When first asked what came before the Big Bang, the subject 
immediately answered that that was unanswerable, and 
probably not even meaningful because it was inherently 
unobservable: 
I think that's an unanswerable question.... It's one 
of those things that like ... Wittgenstein said: if 
you can't speak about it you got to pass over it in 
silence.... It's completely unobservable.... In 
science unobservable is probably not meaningful.... 
You'll never know whether you're right or you're wrong 
and so it's one of these pointless exercises ... so 
many words wasted....  
The subject added that he wouldn't deny that the question 
was interesting, but that it was in the realm of 
metaphysics, by which he meant "fun, but meaningless." 
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Despite the firmness of the above, when the subject was 
explicitly asked whether there could be some future answer, 
he said that that was "entirely possible", but apparently 
only for the abstract "it's happened before" sort of reason 
cited by others, adding that it was very unlikely: 
I wouldn't be surprised if 50 years in the future ... 
somebody comes out with a ... theory that seems to 
explain all the facts and have some relevance in the 
realm before the Big Bang.... I won't rule it out ... 
but just because you can't rule it out doesn't mean 
it's ... probably going to happen.... It's within the 
realm of possibility but little more. 
 
When asked whether he could give any glimpse of such a 
possible answer, he said no, because it "wouldn't be 
observational" (indicating again that the possibility was 
purely technical). When asked about there being no time 
before the Big Bang and therefore no possible causes, he 
said that, yes, that was exactly what he meant, that there 
was nothing there, that it was meaningless to say anything 
else, and that that was the "probable answer" (the word 
"probable" again letting him hedge slightly on the question 
about being permanently unanswerable). 
 
The subject was then asked whether there wasn't still a 
valid question as to why the laws that made this question 
meaningless obtained (this was not a question posed to 
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other subjects, since no other subjects had gone this far 
in denying any valid problem). To this he replied that, no, 
this was a meaningless question; the universe was a "single 
shot," an experiment that couldn't be run again. Pressed to 
answer why some people felt you could still, and always, 
continue to ask "why," he said: 
It's just carrying the human curiosity [too far].... 
If you start reducing backwards and backwards ... very 
quickly ... you're going to come to some explanation 
like ... two electrons tend to repel each other and 
you ask why and you just say that's the way it is, 
there's no inherent explanation for it.... You come to 
the point where you get sort of the fundamental level 
of explanation ... beyond that you can't really go ... 
we will never be able to determine why or why not. 
 
Biographical and background information 
 
The follow biographical and background information was 
collected for each subject. All subjects were graduate 
students and/or working staff (teaching and/or research) at 
either the Harvard or MIT departments of physics or 
Harvard's Center for Astrophysics at the Smithsonian 
Observatory. Orientation was recorded as experimental, 
theoretical, observational or some combination of these. 
Mathematics expertise was subject-evaluated compared to 
other people in their field as low, medium or high. The 
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section on religious beliefs is a brief synopsis of 
pertinent views expressed. 
 
Subject 1 (female): 
 B.S., physics, 1989, M.S., physics, 1991; 4th-year  
  graduate student in physics 
 specialty: atomic physics 
 orientation: experimental 
 math expertise: medium  
 religious beliefs: none in particular ... has a  
  "cultural religious" belief (Jewish) 
 
Subject 2 (male): 
 B.S., physics, 1988, M.S., astronomy, 1991; 4th year  
  graduate student in astronomy 
 specialty: solar and atomic physics 
 orientation: experimental 
 math expertise: medium 
 religious beliefs: spiritual; not an atheist but no  
  particular beliefs 
 
Subject 3 (male): 
 B.S., physics, 1980, M.S., astronomy, 1983, Ph.D.,  
  physics, 1985 
 specialty: clusters of galaxies 
 orientation: observational and theoretical 
 math expertise: high 
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 religious beliefs: "non-specific" 
 
Subject 4 (male): 
 B.S., electrical engineering, 1987, M.S., physics,  
  1989, Ph.D., physics, 1992 
 specialty: astrophysics, supernova remnants; cosmology 
 orientation: theoretical and experimental 
 math expertise: medium 
 religious beliefs: believes in God 
 
Subject 5 (male): 
 B.S., mathematics/physics, 1985, M.S., physics, 1987, 
  Ph.D., theoretical physics, 1992 
 specialty: cosmology 
 orientation: theoretical 
 math expertise: medium 
 religious beliefs: Christian, Protestant evangelical;  
  "not fundamentalist, not charismatic"; believes 
in  God 
 
Subject 6 (female): 
 B.A., M.S., astronomy, 1992 
 specialty: high energy astrophysics, clusters 
 orientation: observational 
 math expertise: medium 
 religious beliefs: no organized religion, but 
"wouldn't 
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  say [she] was an atheist" 
 
Subject 7 (male): 
 B.S., physics/mathematics, 1984, M.S., physics, 1987;  
  ABD, physics 
 specialty: mathematical physics, high-energy theory, 
  string theory 
 orientation: theoretical 
 math expertise: high 
 religious beliefs: "don't really believe in a personal 
  God ... not very well thought out.... I believe 
in 
  sort of underlying structure in the universe." 
 
Subject 8 (male): 
 B.S., applied math and physics, 1991, 1st-year 
graduate 
  student in astronomy 
 specialty: theoretical physics, quantum mechanics 
 orientation: theoretical 
 math expertise: high 
 religious beliefs: non-religious, atheist 
   
Imagery measurements 
 
Table 1 presents the individual results of the Individual 
Differences Questionnaire-Imagery Habit Scale (IDQ-IHS) and 
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VVIQ tests for each subject, as well as the scores for the 
two additional questions inserted into the IDQ-IHS to 
explicitly measure use of imagery in problem-solving.  
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Table 1 
Imagery Measurements 
___________________________________ 
S   IDQ-IHSa   Imagery inb   VVIQc 
             problem-solving 
___________________________________ 
1    4.60         4.50       1.40 
2    4.87         4.50       1.60 
3    4.27         5.00       2.60 
4    4.27         5.00       1.63 
5    4.12         5.00       2.40 
6    3.93         4.00       2.25 
7    4.00         4.00       2.20 
8    3.67         1.50       2.25 
___________________________________ 
min  3.67         1.50       1.40 
max  4.87         5.00       2.60 
M    4.22         4.19       2.04 
SD   0.38         1.16       0.44 
___________________________________ 
aRange 1 (low usage) to 5 (high usage) 
bBased on 2 questions; range 1 (low usage) to 5 (high 
usage) 
cRange 1 (high vividness) to 5 (low vividness) 
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Imagery usage discussion 
 
Independent statements about the use of imagery in the 
subjects' work were extracted from the interviews and 
interview notes and nearly identical statements were then 
grouped together. Three types of responses emerged, with 
each subject falling in just one of the groups: 
 
1. Statement: Imagery is very important in my work; 
visualizing the problem is solving 90% of it. 
n = 5: s2, s3, s4, s5, s7 
 
2. Statement: Imagery usage depends on the problem; I use 
it when building something or for motion problems, but not 
for more mathematically-oriented problems. 
n = 2: s1, s6 
 
3. Statement: Imagery is not very important in my work; I 
rarely use it. 
n = 1: s8 
 
Data relationships  
 
Two approaches were followed for evaluating relationships 
among the data collected for each subject, especially the 
target relationship between problem unsolvability and 
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imagery usage/vividness. The first approach is essentially 
non-statistical and focuses on the discrete, often 
dichotomous explicit statements about the problem of the 
origin of the universe and related matters (e.g., is there 
a valid non-scientific problem there or not) and, given the 
general uniformity of the views expressed, examines extreme 
or infrequent views in light of other equally obvious 
differences among subjects in imagery usage/vividness or 
any of the other data collected (e.g., that a subject who 
alone expressed a certain view had the lowest score on a 
particular measure). 
 
The second approach is statistical and attempts to go 
beyond the general uniformity of subject interview 
responses and extract whatever additional information is to 
be had about the target relationship (as well as highlight 
the possible influence of other factors) by producing a 
single ordinal measure for the degree of belief in problem 
unsolvability, as well as a similar single measure for 
imagery usage/vividness. Given the small sample size and 
relatively open-ended interview format, this unsolvability 
measure consists of a simple ranking of the subjects with 
regard to degree of belief in problem unsolvability, and 
the subsequent analysis focuses on rank order correlations 
and observations between this and other measures. These 
analyses supplement -- sometimes supporting and sometimes 
refuting -- the discrete and more direct (if more isolated) 
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results of the first approach, though the small sample size 
and exploratory nature of the study as a whole limit the 
sophistication and conclusiveness of these analyses. 
 
Discrete data analysis 
 
1. The 7 subjects who expressed the view that there was a 
valid philosophical or religious question to be asked about 
the origin of the universe evidenced a range of 
backgrounds, measured and reported imagery usage and 
measured imagery vividness. This suggests that, at some 
level and to some greater or lesser extent, viewing this 
question as not solved or solvable within current science 
but still meaningful is not dependent on any of these 
background or imagery factors. 
 
2. Only one subject -- s8 -- felt fairly strongly that the 
question of the origin of the universe was a meaningless 
problem -- not only not a valid scientific question but not 
really a valid philosophical or religious question. This 
subject had the lowest (least usage) scores on the IDQ-IHS 
and the two questions regarding use of imagery in problem 
solving. Similarly, this subject alone expressed the view 
in the imagery discussion that imagery was basically not 
important to his work. (On the other hand, the subject's 
score on the VVIQ was only slightly higher (less vivid) 
than average -- within 0.5 standard deviations.)  
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There are also some potentially interesting biographical 
facts about this subject: (a) he was the least experienced 
in the study (a 1st-year graduate student), and (b) was one 
of three subjects with high math expertise. Also, although 
they are not factors that as clearly distinguish the 
subject from the rest of the subjects, it is of potential 
significance that this subject (a) considered himself 
theoretical, and (b) said he was an atheist. We will see 
some data that bears on these differences in the 
correlational studies below. 
 
All of these factors combined tend to suggest that certain, 
relatively infrequent traits -- including, in particular, 
very low imagery usage -- may be conducive to or even 
necessary for the relatively rare view that the question of 
the origin of the universe is not a valid problem. Of 
course, the fact that this subject was the least 
experienced in the study may also be significant, and point 
more to an explanation rooted in professional immaturity 
(or lack of expertise, though the latter seems less likely 
given that the basic formal background seemed to be there 
for this subject as for all others). 
 
3. Only two subjects -- s3 and s6 -- did not explicitly 
embrace the view that this question could someday be 
solved. These subjects were not especially similar to each 
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other, or very different from the rest of the subjects on 
any of the imagery or background factors. The significance 
of these subjects' position is also reduced by the fact 
that they did not so much express a significantly stronger 
relative  pessimism about problem solvability but rather 
only failed to express the fairly weak and non-specific 
belief about a future possible solution that other subjects 
expressed. 
 
4. One can observe that there is some relationship between 
imagery usage as reported in the interview and as measured 
on the IDQ-IHS or problem-solving questions, with only s1 
clearly showing high instrument scores of usage but 
reporting relatively low use of imagery in her work (though 
the subject did report context-dependent use of imagery in 
problem-solving; this is, of course, what the problem-
solving questions measure, though frequency usage on the 
IDQ-IHS does not appear to have carried over to across-the-
board usage in the subject's work). 
 
Statistical analysis 
 
1. Two judges (the author and one other, a clinician with 
course work in college physics) reviewed interview 
responses and ranked subjects in terms of degree of belief 
in problem unsolvability.  As discussed above, this concept 
was broadened somewhat to consider beliefs in the non-
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existence of the problem (i.e., a belief that the problem 
was already solved by science and/or not really valid -- 
beliefs more commonly expressed that was originally 
anticipated) as beliefs in the solvability of the problem, 
making the overall judgment more closely one of problem 
forcefulness/unsolvability vs. problem 
insignificance/solvability. This fits with the original 
study hypothesis linking unsolvability with high imagery 
usage/vividness in that the underlying hypothesized 
requirement of imagability for adequate scientific 
explanation (solvability) could reasonably be expected to 
make frequent/vivid imagers as dissatisfied with the non-
imaged-based abstractions that currently rule the problem 
out of bounds as they are pessimistic about a future non-
image-based solution, while poor visualizers would be less 
sensitive to both the difficulties of current doctrine or 
the difficulties of any future solution. 
 
Both judges were unaware of the subject scores on the 
various imagery measures with the exception of the author 
being aware that s8 had the lowest scores on the IDQ-IHS 
and questions about imagery in problem solving; however, 
this is of little consequence, since this subject so 
clearly ranked at the bottom of the list on degree of 
belief in problem significance/unsolvability. There was 
some initial disagreement about the ranking of some 
subjects, but discussion between the judges produced a 
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consensus. (It would have been possible at that point to 
have instead employed a 3rd judge, but, given the varied 
and often twisting course of the interviews, it was not 
obvious that that would have directly resulted in agreement 
with either of the first two judges, and the lack of 
initial agreement, though indicating limitations in the 
measure or interview methodology, would not seem to present 
particular problems here given the lack of knowledge about 
and objective scoring of the imagery measures.) 
 
A composite imagery ranking was produced using the sum of 
the scores for each subject of the 3 paper-and-pencil 
imagery measures (first inverting the VVIQ score so that a 
higher score indicated more vivid imagery, putting it in 
line with the IDQ-IHS and problem-solving questions on 
which higher scores indicated higher imagery usage). This 
composite could be considered to have over-valued the (two-
question) measure on imagery in problem-solving. However, 
as the correlations reported below indicate, removing this 
component does not significantly change the results, and 
weighting a measure on the specific use of imagery for 
problem-solving is arguably appropriate. 
 
Table 2 presents the ranking of each subject on problem 
unsolvability, the composite imagery usage/vividness rank 
and the actual composite imagery score, as well as 
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between the 
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unsolvability and imagery ranks, which can be seen to be a 
moderately strong 0.83 (p < .02).   
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Table 2 
Rank order correlation of unsolvability and composite 
imagery scores 
______________________________________ 
S   Unsolvability.a  Imageryb  Imageryc   
         rank          rank     score    
______________________________________ 
1      1       2      13.70 
2  2       1      13.77 
3  6       5      12.67 
4  3       3      13.64 
5  5       4      12.72 
6  4       7      11.68 
7  7       6      11.80 
8  8       8       8.92 
______________________________________ 
rs = 0.83, p < .02 
______________________________________ 
aRank 1 = most unsolvable, rank 8 = least unsolvable 
bRank 1 = highest imagery usage/vividness, rank 8 = lowest 
cRange 3.0 (least imagery usage/vividness) to 15.0 (most   
 imagery usage/vividness)
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2. Rank order correlations were also formed between the 
unsolvability measure and other combined (by addition; VVIQ 
inverted) imagery measures (IDQ-IHS and problem-solving 
questions, IDQ-IHS and VVIQ and, finally, VVIQ and problem-
solving questions) and between the unsolvability measure 
and each of the individual imagery measures, as well as 
intercorrelations among the individual imagery measures 
themselves. These correlations, together with the preceding 
correlation between unsolvability and the full composite 
imagery measure (included here for comparison) are 
presented in Table 3. Full product-moment computations were 
performed because of the presence of tied ranks (ranks were 
assigned in those cases by averaging). The correlations 
between unsolvability and combined IDQ-IHS/VVIQ and between 
unsolvability and combined VVIQ/problem-solving questions 
were statistically significant (r = 0.81 and r = 0.79 
respectively, p < .02 for each), as was the correlation 
between unsolvability and the IDQ-IHS by itself (r = 0.78, 
p < .05). The correlation between unsolvability and the 
VVIQ just missed significance at the .05 level(r = 0.69, p 
< .10). All other correlations were not statistically 
significant, including intercorrelations among the imagery 
measures.
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Table 3 
Additional unsolvability and imagery correlations 
___________________________________________________________
_ 
Relationship      Correlation 
___________________________________________________-
_________ 
Unsolvability and IDQ-IHS/VVIQ/problem-solving   0.83** 
 
Unsolvability and IDQ-IHS/VVIQ    0.81** 
Unsolvability and VVIQ/problem-solving   0.79** 
Unsolvability and IDQ-IHS/problem-solving   0.43 
 
Unsolvability and IDQ-IHS    0.78* 
Unsolvability and VVIQ    0.69 
Unsolvability and problem-solving   0.37 
 
IDQ-IHS and VVIQ     0.53 
VVIQ and problem-solving      - 0.17 
IDQ-IHS and problem-solving    0.60 
___________________________________________________________
_ 
**p < .02 
* p < .05 
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3. The additional data collected on each subject (e.g., 
religious views, level of math expertise, etc.) is, with 
perhaps the single exception of experience level, not 
sufficiently detailed or differentiated for statistical 
analysis. However, an analysis of experience level is 
possible, and several other observations can be made 
connecting these factors to the above rankings: 
 a. The rank order correlation between unsolvability 
and experience level as measured by years since beginning 
graduate study (there were no particular gaps in experience 
among subjects) is 0.55. This correlation is not 
statistically significant, and tends to support the view 
that unsolvability is not primarily a matter of subject 
experience or professional maturity.  
 b. The 3 subjects who categorized themselves as having 
"high" math expertise -- s3, s7 and s8 -- are the 3 
subjects ranking lowest on unsolvability (i.e., viewing the 
problem as already solved, a non-problem or solvable), 
supporting a similar observation made in the discrete 
analysis with regard to this factor. 
 c. The 3 subjects who included "experimental" in their 
self-categorization of professional orientation were the 3 
subjects ranking highest on unsolvability (the other 
subjects categorized themselves as theoretical and/or 
observational), supporting an earlier suggestion regarding 
a connection between a theoretical (or at least non-
experimental) orientation and problem solvability. 
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 d.  The 4 subjects who reported some explicit belief 
in God -- s2, s4, s6 and s5 -- ranked 2nd through 5th 
consecutively on unsolvability. This offers some support 
for the reasonable idea that a belief in God may be 
connected to or even to some degree be sufficient (though 
not necessary) for believing in the relative significance 
and unsolvability (at least in non-religious terms) of the 
problem.   
 e. The two female subjects ranked 1st and 4th in 
problem unsolvability. 
 f. The responses of subjects in the imagery usage 
discussion regarding the importance of imagery in their 
work did not provide any particular new information in 
conjunction with the unsolvability rankings.
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DISCUSSION 
 
The goals of this study were to explore the opinions and 
reasoning of knowledgeable subjects on a potentially 
unsolvable problem -- the question of the origin of the 
universe -- and to examine a possible relationship between 
these opinions and visual imagery.  On the first of these 
points, there was considerable uniformity: All subjects 
reflected the current view in physics and cosmology that 
the universe began with the Big Bang. In addition, all 
subjects expressed the view that the question of what came 
before the Big Bang could not be addressed by current day 
science. All subjects but one thought that there 
nevertheless remained a valid philosophical or religious 
question, though there was some variation on the quickness 
with which these subjects left the scientific perspective, 
and their view of the significance of this residual 
question. Finally, all subjects but two expressed the view 
that a future physics could perhaps address this problem 
more completely, though for almost all this view seemed to 
represent more a general faith in continued scientific 
progress or the belief that anything was possible, and not 
any particular sense that a solution would be forthcoming. 
Indeed, subjects seemed to have no particular sense that 
the question would actually be solved, and 7 of 8 subjects 
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expressed some belief in there being limits on what we can 
understand. 
 
The uniformity of the stated responses (despite measurable 
variations in the strength of responses) is quite striking, 
and in contrast to the view one might form from reading 
well-known dissenters, or, more generally, from tracking 
the progress of cosmology in the popular press, which 
sometimes seems to suggest that the solution of the problem 
of the origin of the universe is at hand, if only one had 
the expertise to grasp it. 
 
From these responses we may tentatively conclude that the 
question of the origin of the universe is, within today's 
science, viewed by knowledgeable subjects as unsolvable, or 
even meaningless, though this later categorization must be 
quickly qualified by the near unanimous opinion among the 
subjects that the problem is in fact meaningful if we step 
outside the restrictions of currently understood physics. 
Attempting to deny the problem because of such restrictions 
was considered "contrived," or a "cop-out" by some 
subjects.  
 
For most subjects the stated nature of this unsolvability 
was that current physical law simply does not apply if we 
go back to the moment of the Big Bang (or the moment before 
it), making the question of what came before the Big Bang 
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literally not a part of current physics. However, it is 
clear from the interviews that subjects did not view this 
as a mere formal limitation to be bridged by incremental 
expansion of physical law. Rather, when pressed on the 
question of what ultimately came before the Big Bang 
subjects generally volunteered that this was more a 
question for philosophy or religion and not one to be 
readily resolved by expanded scientific effort. It seemed, 
indeed, that the question of what might have come before 
the Big Bang was only the current incarnation or scientific 
context of the problem of understanding how there could be 
an ultimate beginning (such as the Big Bang) without 
immediately inviting the question of what in some sense 
preceded or caused it. 
 
As to whether this problem is permanently unsolvable, most 
subjects did express the belief that the problem might 
someday be solved within science. However, the lack of 
specificity and conviction in this belief seem to suggest 
that this is based primarily on a general faith in science 
and/or a reluctance to rule anything out as impossible, 
especially in light of previous difficult problems in 
science that were later solved. No subjects expressed any 
substantive basis for seeing how this might actually happen 
in this case, and most considered it unlikely, if 
nevertheless abstractly possible. Most subjects also 
expressed the view that there were limits on what could be 
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known, suggesting some tension between believing that this 
problem may in fact be unsolvable and the reluctance to 
cast any specific problem as permanently unsolvable. Future 
work in this area might try to elucidate the nature of this 
faith in science and/or reluctance to accept what subjects 
otherwise seem to substantively view as apparent 
impossibility/unsolvability.  
 
In any case, the overall consistency of the reasoning this 
problem produced among knowledgeable subjects who differed 
on a number of other dimensions, and the failure to offer 
any serious glimpse of a possible solution can also be 
viewed as supporting the actual, rather than merely 
perceived unsolvability of the problem.  
 
The relative uniformity of response makes evaluation of the 
second objective of the study -- the relationship between 
such reasoning and visual imagery -- more difficult. The 
speculation at the outset of the study was that individuals 
with the most frequent or vivid visual imagery would have 
the strongest feelings about the unsolvability of the 
problem, while those with the least frequent or vivid 
imagery would be more optimistic. No subjects, in turned 
out, could be said to be optimistic about solving the 
problem. 
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However, the one subject who basically considered the 
problem meaningless from any point of view had the lowest 
measured image frequency as determined both by the IDQ-IHS 
and the subjects' own statements of their use of imagery, 
with the subject reporting, in the latter case, virtually 
no use of imagery, whereas half the subjects said imagery 
was central to their work. This belief that the problem is 
meaningless can be viewed as consistent with a belief in 
problem solvability (and the link between this belief and 
the subject's low imagery usage is therefore consistent 
with the hypothesized link between solvability and low 
imagery usage/vividness) if we add to our concept of an 
optimistic view of problem solvability a failure to 
perceive there being much of any problem there in the first 
place, either because the problem is not well formed or is 
already solved. This seems a reasonable refinement, since 
the hypothesized link between concepts of causation and 
visual imagery could be expected to not only desensitize 
less frequent/less vivid imagers to the difficulty of 
solving the problem but also to reduce in such individuals 
the perceived need for a causal analysis in the first 
place, or to more willingly accept that non-image-based 
formalizations (such as the absolute beginning of space and 
time provided by the Big Bang theory) dismiss, if not solve 
the problem. 
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Viewed the other way around, the expectation that subjects 
with the most vivid visual imagery would be less optimistic 
might be reasonably modified to include the idea that such 
subjects would more clearly perceive the weight and 
forcefulness of the problem itself, since such individuals 
are more likely to engage in the visualization processes 
through which the literature suggests causation is so often 
considered. For such individuals, the attempt (and failure) 
to produce visual images for this problem underscore the 
reality (and intractability) of the problem. 
  
On the other hand, the interviews did not contain many 
spontaneous references to a failure of imagery in tackling 
this problem. This may, however, point to the dominance of 
a scientific mode of reasoning and explanation that was 
evident in most subjects (e.g., some subjects who said that 
imagery was "intrinsic" to their work during the imagery 
discussion had, until that point, made little or no mention 
of it). This scientific style, as it were, may reduce the 
visibility of an underlying connection between imagery and 
perceived problem unsolvability.  
 
Similarly, there is a question as to whether the general 
uniformity of response with regard to the meaningfulness 
and unsolvability of the problem does not, in the presence 
of a reasonable range of imagery usage/vividness scores, 
suggest that there is in fact no link between unsolvability 
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and imagery. However, it may be that this uniformity is due 
to imagery competencies that are basic enough (e.g., the 
basic ability to form and understand visual images at some 
appropriate level) to be common to most individuals, with 
obvious differences in stated beliefs visible only at 
relatively extreme values (e.g.,  s8's very low imagery 
usage measures). (The original study expectation that there 
might be obvious differences in solvability beliefs linked 
to imagery usage or vividness was based in part on the 
existence in the literature of a range of views on 
solvability for this problem, as well as, and perhaps more 
so, for what seems the conceptually related mind-body 
problem. However, it may be that such published views, 
especially for the problem of the origin of the universe, 
are not that representative of the views of working 
professionals.) 
 
Although, given the above model, evidence in the form of 
obvious differences may be observable only at the extremes, 
evidence in the form of less obvious differences may be 
available by looking at more subtle measures below the 
level of dichotomous stated beliefs. The sample size and 
open-ended nature of the study suggest caution in such an 
approach, but at least some such evidence can be found in 
the significant correlation (r = 0.83, p < .02) between an 
overall ranking of subjects by degree (vs. mere statement) 
of belief in problem significance/unsolvability and a 
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composite imagery score formed by summing the 3 objective 
imagery measures1. There were also significant correlations 
between unsolvability and imagery usage alone as measured 
by the IDQ-IHS (r = 0.78, p < .05) and a near significant 
correlation between unsolvability and the VVIQ measure of 
imagery vividness (r = 0.69, p < .10). However, the largest 
correlation was, interestingly, the 0.83 value produced by 
using the composite of all 3 imagery measures, none of 
which correlated significantly with any other. A more 
careful analysis of the elements of this intriguing 
composite relationship is beyond the reach of the current 
data set. 
 
There are possible confounding factors, including 
mathematical expertise and a theoretical (vs. an 
experimental) orientation, both of which appeared tied to 
weaker (lower ranked) beliefs in problem unsolvability and 
greater satisfaction with current explanations (it is 
perhaps noteworthy that the higher unsolvability ratings 
and related higher imagery scores of the self-described 
experimentalists is consistent with Galton's finding that 
(experimental) physicists were among the better imagers). 
The data also suggests a possible role for religious 
belief. 
 
1Thanks to William Hirst for suggesting this statistical 
analysis. 
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Experience level, on the other hand, did not appear to be 
significantly related to unsolvability beliefs, confirming 
the expectation that such beliefs and differences in them 
would, by virtue of their primarily structural dependency 
on basic cognitive competencies such as imagery ability, 
not be sensitive to the novice/expert distinction prominent 
in many other situations. 
 
However, the current study did not collect enough data to 
examine any of these factors while controlling for the 
others, and the question of cause and effect is quite open 
at the moment (e.g., it may be that greater imagery 
capabilities predispose a physicist both to experimental 
work and to a dissatisfaction with the constraints of 
certain non-image-based theoretical constructs).  
 
In any case, this statistical analysis and some of the 
related findings around explicit stated beliefs still 
suggest a possible role for one or more imagery 
capabilities in beliefs about problem solvability. While 
this may support the posited underlying necessity of 
imagery for adequate physical explanation and the 
consequential likely unsolvability of the problem at hand, 
several factors warrant caution in making this or any other 
interpretation of the results:  
 1. The complexity of the beliefs and posited 
relationships allow for multiple approaches to and 
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interpretations of the data (e.g., it may be that those who 
view the problem as insignificant could in fact be said to 
see it as unsolvable -- so clearly as to dismiss the 
problem -- rather than as effectively solved). 
 2. The possible confounding influence of a 
mathematical/theoretical orientation supports the early 
concern that a relationship between imagaibility and 
unsolvability may point not to true problem unsolvability 
but to the inability of imagers to accept a valid, non-
image-based solution. 
 3. The small sample size not only makes controlling 
secondary factors difficult but raises questions about how 
representative of current scientific thinking the sample 
is; e.g., what relationships might be observed among those 
critical of the Big Bang theory ? 
 4. The VVIQ and other imagery measures are, as noted 
in the literature review, not without controversy in their 
measurement or interpretation. 
 
Future study in this area might profitably continue both 
tacks of analysis taken here and address some of the above 
concerns by (a) securing an adequate number of subjects 
with a greater range of scientific beliefs and, especially, 
with some of the minority/extreme views and imagery 
capabilities discussed (e.g., subjects who believe the 
problem of the origin of the universe completely solved; 
who have virtually no visual imagery experiences at all; or 
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who are critical of the Big Bang), perhaps by soliciting 
subjects with such views explicitly; (b) setting out from 
the start to explicitly and closely measure some of the 
different belief components identified in the current work, 
including the use of standard questions to allow for better 
quantification and comparison of stated beliefs (vs. the 
more exploratory goals of the current study); and (c) 
examining a wider range of imagery capabilities (e.g., 
imagery control) and attempting to offset some of the known 
problems in imagery measurement (e.g., through the use of 
more directed imagery interview questions, additional 
tests, etc.). 
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Appendix A 
 
This section asks questions about the frequency and use of your 
visual images. Please indicate your answer to each of the 
questions by circling a 1 if you strongly disagree with the 
statement or a 5 if you strongly agree, or some value in between 
to indicate an intermediate state of disagreement or agreement.  
 
 
1. I often use mental images or pictures to help me remember 
things. 
   
  strongly disagree 1  2  3  4  5  strongly agree 
 
2. By using mental pictures of the elements of a problem, I am 
often able to arrive at a solution. 
 
  strongly disagree 1  2  3  4  5  strongly agree 
 
3. My thinking often consists of mental pictures or images. 
 
  strongly disagree 1  2  3  4  5  strongly agree 
 
4. I find it difficult to form a mental picture of anything. 
 
  strongly disagree 1  2  3  4  5  strongly agree 
 
5. I often use mental pictures to solve problems. 
 
  strongly disagree 1  2  3  4  5  strongly agree 
 
6. When remembering a scene, I use verbal descriptions rather 
than mental pictures. 
 
  strongly disagree 1  2  3  4  5  strongly agree 
 
7. I never use mental pictures or images when trying to solve 
problems. 
 
  strongly disagree 1  2  3  4  5  strongly agree 
 
8. I often enjoy the use of mental pictures to reminisce. 
 
  strongly disagree 1  2  3  4  5  strongly agree 
 
9. I can close my eyes and easily picture a scene I have 
experienced. 
 
  strongly disagree 1  2  3  4  5  strongly agree 
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10. I think that most people think in terms of mental pictures 
whether they are completely aware of it or not. 
 
  strongly disagree 1  2  3  4  5  strongly agree 
 
11. I can easily picture moving objects in my mind. 
 
  strongly disagree 1  2  3  4  5  strongly agree 
 
12. I do not form a mental picture of people or places when 
reading of them. 
 
  strongly disagree 1  2  3  4  5  strongly agree 
 
13. When someone describes something that happens to him or her, 
I sometimes find myself vividly imagining the events that 
happened. 
 
  strongly disagree 1  2  3  4  5  strongly agree 
 
14. I have only vague visual impressions of scenes I have 
experienced. 
 
  strongly disagree 1  2  3  4  5  strongly agree 
 
15. Listening to someone recount his experiences does not 
usually arouse mental pictures of the incidents being described.  
 
  strongly disagree 1  2  3  4  5  strongly agree 
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Appendix B 
 
 
This section aims to determine the vividness of your visual 
imagery. The items of the test will possibly bring certain 
images to your mind. You are asked to rate the vividness of each 
image using the 5-point scale given below. For example, if your 
image is "vague and dim" then give it a rating of 4. After each 
item write the appropriate number in the space provided. 
Throughout the test, refer to the rating scale when judging the 
vividness of each image. Try to do each item separately, 
independent of how you may have done other items. You may keep 
your eyes open or closed. 
 
 
Ratings: 1 Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision 
 
  2 Clear and reasonably vivid 
 
  3 Moderately clear and vivid 
 
  4 Vague and dim 
 
  5 No image at all, you only "know" that you are 
   thinking of the object 
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Ratings: 1 Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision 
 
  2 Clear and reasonably vivid 
 
  3 Moderately clear and vivid 
 
  4 Vague and dim 
 
  5 No image at all, you only "know" that you are 
   thinking of the object 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------
- 
 
For questions 1-4, think of some relative or friend whom you 
frequently see (but who is not with you at present) and consider 
carefully the picture that comes before your mind's eye.  
 
  1. The exact contour of face, head, shoulders and body. 
 
  Rating ______ 
 
  2. Characteristic poses of head, attitudes of body, etc. 
 
  Rating ______ 
 
  3. The precise carriage, length of step, etc. in walking. 
 
  Rating ______ 
 
  4. The different colors worn in some familiar clothes. 
 
  Rating ______ 
 
Visualize a rising sun. Consider carefully the picture that 
comes before your mind's eye. 
 
  5. The sun is rising above the horizon into a hazy sky. 
  
  Rating ______ 
 
  6. The sky clears and surrounds the sun with blueness. 
 
  Rating ______ 
  
  7. Clouds. A storm blows up, with flashes of lightning. 
 
  Rating ______ 
  
  8. A rainbow appears. 
 
  Rating ______ 
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Ratings 1 Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision 
 
  2 Clear and reasonably vivid 
 
  3 Moderately clear and vivid 
 
  4 Vague and dim 
 
  5 No image at all, you only "know" that you are 
   thinking of the object 
----------------------------------------------------------------
- 
Think of the front of a shop which you often go to. Consider the 
picture that comes before your mind's eye. 
 
  9. The overall appearance of the shop from the opposite  
     side of the road. 
   
  Rating ______ 
  
 10. A window display including colors, shapes and details 
     of individual items for sale. 
 
  Rating ______ 
  
 11. You are near the entrance. The color, shape and details  
     of the door.  
 
  Rating ______ 
  
 12. You enter the shop and go to the counter. The counter  
     assistant serves you. Money changes hands. 
 
  Rating ______ 
  
Finally, think of a country scene which involves trees, 
mountains 
and a lake. Consider the picture that comes before your mind's 
eye. 
  Rating ______ 
  
 13. The contours of the landscape. 
 
  Rating ______ 
  
 14. The color and shape of the trees. 
 
  Rating ______ 
  
 15. The color and shape of the lake. 
 
  Rating ______ 
  
 16. A strong wind blows on the trees and on the lake, 
     causing waves. 
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  Rating ______ 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
